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Deforestation worldwide is a major concern. In developing countries, it is a
merciless and devastating reality. My thesis addresses how local governance insti-
tutions’ strength influences this phenomenon, focusing on the Colombian Andes.
The theoretical analysis examines spatial patterns of illegal deforestation when
enforcement is costly, and costs rise with distance from governmental centers. Those
spatial patterns depend on the interaction between transportation costs incurred
by farmers growing crops on deforested land and enforcement costs incurred by
government officials conducting on-the-ground monitoring of deforestation. Areas
closer to governmental centers can be monitored effectively and are thus less subject
to illegal deforestation. Illegal deforestation is therefore more likely in areas where
monitoring costs are high, but farmers’ transportation costs are not. The calibration
exercise then shows, that in this context, patches of deforestation might arise within
the forest, causing unwanted forest fragmentation.
Based on these results I study empirically, first, if the effect of access difficulty
on deforestation may be non-monotonic in accessibility, causing forest fragmenta-
tion; and second, if this fragmentation is more likely to occur when enforcement
is more costly. I approach this question in two manners: (1) using a cubic func-
tion of access difficulty interacted with measures of enforcement capacity and (2)
non-parametrically using indicators for discrete ranges of access difficulty, again
interacted with measures of enforcement capacity.
I construct for this purpose a panel data set for the Colombian Andes from a
variety of sources. Data on deforestation comes from satellite imaging at a 30mx30m
resolution in two periods (2000-2005) and (2005-2010), this data was matched with
biophysical variables such as, altitude, slope, precipitation, soil type, and roads using
geographical information systems (GIS), as well as with socioeconomic variables
which vary by municipality and time.
The regressions show a significant non-monotonic effect of access difficulty
on deforestation. The evidence shows that deforestation probability first decreases
with access difficulty, and it then increases in remoter places. This evidences forest
fragmentation as one moves away from roads. Moreover, this pattern is affected
by the fiscal performance index (a proxy for enforcement capacity) of the munici-
palities, showing that municipalities with lower enforcement capacity have a higher
probability to present illegal deforestation at remote places. This research adds to
the deforestation literature, by studying the spatial reach of governance capacity
and how it affects deforestation patterns. The findings highlight the importance of
taking enforcement and monitoring costs as well as their spatial variation into ac-
count, when designing land-use policies and defining the institutional arrangements,
funding and monitoring processes to implement them.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Facing a potential non-return point due to climate change, forests, their contri-
bution to carbon storage and the prevention of deforestation are a prominent topic.
The recent increases in deforestation in the Brazilian and Colombian Amazon foster
a wealth of explanations, yet little agreement on the actions needed to address these
spikes. Some argue that the increment in deforestation is due to lax governments
and their alignments with economic development interests. [1] Others consider that
governments have been too slow to react to confront these crises. [2] In practice,
although forest conservation policies are in place, conservation is not strictly en-
forced, and there are few deterrent or consequences for land clearing. To address
illegal deforestation conservation policies must be designed and implemented. For
this purpose, one not only needs the political will, but this will must be backed
up with resources. Unfortunately, this is still often not be sufficient. In Colombia,
for example, the budget for the whole National Environment System (SINA), was
decreased for 2019 to around 0.3 percent of government expenditures. [2]. Such
reductions perpetuate the country’s inability to enforce forest conservation policies.
In this thesis I consider the costs of implementing deforestation deterrence
policies. Moreover, I recognize that policies’ surveillance and enforcement costs
1
vary with location. Results show that, in contexts with low institutional capacity
(i.e. low budgets, lack of personnel, lack of human capacity, among others), these
costs might render unintended harmful environmental effects, such as habitat frag-
mentation.1 In the first part of the study, I model this process theoretically, showing
how the steep increase of enforcement costs associated with low accessibility results
in changes in the expected deforestation patterns. In the second part of the study,
I explore this possibility empirically, finding a non-monotonic2 pattern between ac-
cessibility and the probability of illegal deforestation in the Colombian Andes. I
also find a significant change of this pattern when enforcement variables are added
to the analysis. Based on these results I present recommendations to reduce illegal
deforestation, in particular for Colombia, by improving local implementation capac-
ity of local governments including: administrative capacity building, access to new
resources, and improvements in optimizing present resource sources.
As global population continues to grow, the demand for food and agricultural
products is simultaneously rising and is expected to continue this way. Since land
is a fundamental input for agricultural production this growing demand is spurring
the demand for productive land. On the other hand, ecosystem services provided by
natural habitat are now well recognized and are becoming scarce, as land use change,
from natural to productive, increases globally. [3] Therefore the land market faces
a classic externalities problem; where land use change decisions are based solely on
the benefits of agricultural production, but do not consider social and environmen-
1Fragmentation is defined as the degree to which habitat in a landscape exists as a single
continuous unit versus smaller, isolated patches.
2Non-monotonic means neither constantly increasing not constantly decreasing
2
tal costs of deforestation. Land is becoming a scarce input and deforestation and
fragmentation continue to rise, the rate of global forest loss is both rapid (125,000
km2/year between 2001 and 2012) and increasing (by 2,000 km2/year). [4]
Globally, although a few large patches of pristine forests still remain, there
is an increasing need to manage mosaic lands3 where both land covers (agriculture
and natural habitat) are highly valuable simultaneously and thus the conflicts be-
tween them become more complex and intense. [6] There is a growing set of policies
targeted at solving this problem: command and control, assignation property rights,
economic incentives and voluntary agreements, among others. Some of these poli-
cies have been prolifically studied, in particular: protected areas, property rights
designation and payments for environmental services (PES). [3, 7–9]
There is evidence that, although the policies are a necessary piece to effec-
tively manage this problem, they are not enough. Policies need to be implemented,
and in particular, in developing countries this is still a challenge. Often, local in-
stitutions are in charge of implementation, including surveillance and enforcement
responsibilities. These local governments, are often overborne with these and other
responsibilities, while their budgets are scarce, rendering them incapable of perform-
ing implementation duties effectively.
Land has a singular characteristic: location. This characteristic has been
recognized as important for both, agricultural production (i.e. input and output
transportation costs) and ecosystem service provision (e.g. recreation, water provi-
3Chomitz et. al 2006 define three types of forest: trans-frontier, frontier and mosaic lands [5].
He uses the term mosaic lands to refer to a mix of agriculture and forest patches, from dottings of
trees between pastures to large forested islands surrounded by farming.
3
sion, biodiversity conservation). For agricultural production: distance to the market
has a well recognized positive effect on deforestation [10–12]. For ecosystem services,
tools like Systematic Conservation Planning (SCP) have been designed to organize
land to spatially optimize their provision [13].
However, the spatial aspects of policy implementation have often been ignored.
In particular, costs of surveillance and enforcement, will vary by location, as most
of this work has to be done as in-person visits, either to make sure that policies
are being followed or if not, to take the corresponding action. As a result, policy
implementation close the administrative centers, where institutions are physically
located, is much cheaper than in locations relatively away from administrative cen-
ters. In the latter, where the roads are scarce, terrain is difficult and mobility is
restricted, these costs can become very high.
In consequence, land use policies might be implemented in places of easy ac-
cess, but not as much at remoter places, where surveillance and enforcement is more
costly. This generates an incentive for farmers to illegally deforest at places more
remote, while leaving closer areas forested. A hiding process emerges, where defor-
estation increases at places less accessible, reversing the traditional von Thunen 4
pattern and fragmenting the forest.
My research recognizes the spatial variation of surveillance and enforcement
costs, and its effect on illegal deforestation, first theoretically and then empirically.
It focuses on areas where both agriculture and environmental benefits are positive
4von Thunen argues that land use activities will be organized in circular rings around the
market, due to their different transportation costs. According to this model, farming will be done
until a certain radius where it is not profitable anymore, and from there on natural land will
prevail [14]
4
(i.e. mosaic lands). The theory presented shows how enforcement costs can end up
reversing the expected positive effect of accessibility on deforestation.
This relation between illegal deforestation pattern and enforcement is then
empirically studied in two different areas in the Colombian Andes: in forest reserves,
where cutting the forest is prohibited, and in non-protected areas. In both cases,
the empirical analysis shows that access difficulty (i.e. measured as slope-weighted
distance to roads, to account for the effort of walking) is non-monotonically related to
deforestation. Moreover, the enforcement proxies used, affect the obtained pattern
showing that the better the enforcement capabilities, the lower the probability of
deforestation at remote places.
Based on the theoretical and empirical results and to improve the local insti-
tutional capacity, and in particular reduce the probability of forest fragmentation,
recommendations to reduce fragmentation within reserves, by strengthening the mu-
nicipalities capacity to increase their budgets and manage their funds are presented.
Although drivers of deforestation have been prolifically studied, deforestation,
and particularly illegal deforestation, continues to rise. The literature on drivers of
deforestation has recognized the importance of understanding the spatial nature of
these processes. The literature on policy evaluation recognizes that policies are not
enough to stop deforestation, and that governance and in particular surveillance
and enforcement capacities of the implementing institutions play a principal role
on policy success. The research I undertake adds to this literature studying how
governance variables, also depend on space, and as such, affect the expected spatial
patterns of deforestation producing unwanted forest fragmentation.
5
This document continues as follows. In Chapter 2, I present a review of the
related literature and in Chapter 3 I describe the empirical context. In Chapters 3
and 4, I introduce the theoretical model and a numerical calibration and sensitivity
analysis. I continue explaining the data and methodology used for the econometric
analysis (Chapter 6) and in Chapter 7, I present the results. I end with some policy
implications and conclusion (Chapter 8).
6
Chapter 2: Literature Review
This literature reviews starts by describing the problem deforestation is still
represents, particularly in developing countries. Then I introduce the literature on
drivers of deforestation and summarize its general conclusions. I continue by de-
scribing the literature evaluating the effectiveness of deforestation prevention policies
and strategies including protected areas, property right assignation and payments
for ecosystem services. Then I address the literature of forest governance and focus
on the results related to monitoring and enforcement. To finalize the chapter, I de-
scribe the studies most closely related to this research, which recognize conceptually,
theoretically or empirically the spatial dimension of monitoring and enforcement of
environmental policies.
While there is growing evidence, both in academic and non-academic liter-
ature, highlighting the importance of goods and services generated by forests, in-
cluding carbon storage, biodiversity habitat, water filtration, storm mitigation, dis-
ease suppression, timber and non timber products, wild foods and medicines, and
recreation; [15–17] forests continue to face high risks of degradation, fragmenta-
tion, conversion to other uses and unsustainable exploitation. [3, 4, 18] From the
local provision of non-timber forest products to the regulation of climate, sustaining
7
the biophysical properties of forests remains one of the most important goals for
policymakers.
Moreover, the remaining natural forest continues to be distributed in smaller
and more dispersed patches [19,20] Ineffective land conservation does not only allow
for more deforestation, but it may also increase forest fragmentation. Fragmenta-
tion, as well as the reduction in total forest area, is identified as an essential determi-
nant of the amount and quality environmental services produced in an area [21–26].
Mosaic forests include, as already mentioned, landscapes which range from
dotting of trees between pastures, to large forested islands surrounded by farming. [5]
Although this type of forests are often overlooked by environmental policy, mosaic
lands are important because: 1) they contain a large proportion of forest dwellers,
and consequently the interaction between forests and people is large, rendering trees
there particularly important as source of economic income as well as ecosystem
services, 2) although they may have more secure land tenure than forest frontier
lands, they are also closer to markets and have higher land value for agricultural
purposes, and 3) existing forest fragmentation places biodiversity in these areas
under higher risk of extinction. [5]
Drivers of deforestation have been prolifically studied, from country wide com-
parisons to very detailed local panel data available from geographic information
systems (GIS) and satellite images [3]. There are numerous previous reviews of the
drivers of deforestation, some of the most cited include: Angelsen and Kaimowitz
1999; [27],Geist and Lambin 2002; [28] Chomitz 2007; [5], Rudel et al. 2009; [29],
Angelsen and Rudel 2013 [30]; Pfaff, Amacher, and Sills 2013); [31].
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Land users’ decisions to convert land from forest to agriculture, pasture, or
mining are influenced by a number of factors (i.e. indirect drivers [32]). The bio-
physical characteristics of land, such as slope, elevation, wetness, and soil suitabil-
ity, influence the types of economic activity that different lands can support. The
market demand for agricultural and timber commodities, reflected through prices,
affects the revenues that can be gained from exploiting forests or converting them
to agriculture. Characteristics of the built environment, such as roads and towns,
influence the costs of transporting goods to market. The households or communities
making land use decisions vary in their social, economic, cultural and demographic
characteristics. [3, 32]
Recently a meta-analysis by Busch, Jonah and Ferreti. 2017, [3] found 121
studies of drivers between 1996 and 2013. Their results show that roads, urban areas,
population, soil suitability, agricultural activity, and proximity to agriculture are
consistently associated with higher deforestation, while slope, elevation, protected
areas, and poverty are consistently associated with lower deforestation.
Variables related to access are among the first to be studied as drivers of
deforestation. Dating back as far as Johann Heinrich von Thunen’s quantitative
spatial model, in which economic returns determine how land is allocated between
forests and agriculture. [14] Von Thunen’s model shows that since returns diminish
as transportation costs increase, activities with relatively high transportation costs
will be located closer to cities while activities with lower transportation costs will
be located further away from populated centers or markets. Empirical evidence also
shows that lands situated nearer to roads are associated with higher deforestation.
9
[10–12]
Drivers interact in complex ways. For example, fertile agricultural soil invites
deforestation directly, and also encourages the construction of roads, which spurs
further deforestation. [3] Moreover, the causality can run in both directions. For
example, while growing populations can increase demand for deforestation, more
deforested land can also support a greater population. [3, 33] Also, regarding in-
come as a driver of deforestation, the existence of an “environmental Kuznets curve
for deforestation”, where deforestation first increases when countries are develop-
ing and the agricultural frontier is expanding and income increases, then it peaks,
and starts falling when forests become scarce and recreation and environmental ser-
vices are highly valued by the wealthier populations is also proposed. [34] Moreover,
deforesting decisions are made within the context of varying ownership and man-
agement rights, ranging from protected public lands, to open access commons, to
leased concessions, to privately owned land with varying degrees of tenure security
and varying levels of war, violence, and corruption. [3]
While there is a general recognition of the importance of the forested areas
and their ecosystem services, and despite the significant efforts from governments,
NGOs, and multilateral agencies (among others) to stop deforestation, the latter re-
mains rampant. Multiple strategies and policies for conserving forests have emerged
to solve the deforestation problem. These include, among others, the declaration of
protected areas through national or regional parks, the assignment of property and
management rights to individuals or communities, and the design of economic incen-
tives such as payments for ecosystem services (PES) to voluntarily protect forested
10
land. Evaluating the effectiveness of these policies has been an important subject
of the drivers of deforestation literature. [35, 36]
The expanding global protected area (PAs) network will likely meet its Aichi
target of protecting 17% of the planet’s surface by 2020 (CBD; http://www.cbd.int/sp/targets).
In fact, protected areas have even been identified as the most important land-use
on the planet [37]. The majority of the most recent PAs are located in developing
countries, where biodiversity is greatest and there is substantial pressure on natural
resources [38,39]. In particular, Central America and South America are the regions
with the highest percentage of protected terrestrial areas, where 28.2% and 25% of
their territory respectively is under some kind of protection [40].
Assessments have demonstrated repeatedly that PAs experience significantly
lower rates of forest clearing in comparison to their unprotected surroundings [3,7,36,
39]. Although well-managed PAs have been proved to reduce rates of habitat loss in
terrestrial environments [41,42] there are still major shortfalls in both coverage and
effectiveness of PAs [43,44]. Fragmentation has been recognized as a problem within
PAs, even when it is reduced in comparison with their buffer zones for example [45].
Using matching as an empirical strategy to avoid selection bias, analyses de-
termine that parks do lead to avoided deforestation. [9, 13, 46, 47] Most of these
studies however, do not include variables of enforcement and management needed
to deter deforestation. [36] Overall, these empirical assessments find that even the
most effective PAs incur some deforestation within their boundaries.
The effect of PES on decreasing deforestation might also be affected by selec-
tion bias, where the mechanism for such payments are only implemented at areas
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which would in other cases also display high forest governance capabilities. Lit-
erature assessing the effectiveness of payments for ecosystem services in reducing
deforestation initially find the effect on avoided deforestation to be small. [48, 49]
Assigning property rights and forest management to communities is a strategy
that has also readily been evaluated. [50] The literature shows that in 81% of the
cases these policies can be associated with a positive impact on forest cover. [36].
Spatial studies of community forest management find that smaller group size, higher
secondary education, together with spatial distribution and the level of deforestation
within the community, reduce deforestation rates. [51]
Clearly, policies are not enough to deter deforestation. Such policies must
be accompanied by good quality governance and strong institutional capacity in
the implementing organizations. This is particularly important if the policies are
originated or designed from outside the forested area, but implemented locally.
Governance is a wide term that includes at least 3 levels:(i) decision mak-
ing processes, (ii) rules and policies, and (iii) enforcement and monitoring. The
variables used to measure governance vary widely as well, and include ownership
rights, presence of environmental NGOs, and rule of law, and democracy. [8] These
variables are harder to measure in micro settings, so much of the evidence linking
these variables and deforestation is drawn from inter country comparisons. [52–55]
A meta-analysis undertaken in 2018 shows, however, that the effect of governance
on deforestation depends on which variable is used to represent governance. [8]
One of the important variables studied in forest governance literature is related
to surveillance and enforcement capacity. Enforcement variables have been found
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related to lower deforestation, suggesting that law enforcement can play a key role
in reducing deforestation. [3] For example, law enforcement prevented encroachment
into a national park by coffee growers in Sumatra [56] and heightened monitoring
of the forest code by police in Brazil also reduced deforestation. [57] Additionally,
high scores in rule of law are found to increase the likelihood of reaching a tipping
point in deforestation. [58]
One of the most important hurdles for implementing institutions is their fi-
nancial budget and personnel deficiency, required to meet the high enforcement and
surveillance costs of conservation policies. [13,36,41] For example, for protected ar-
eas, the costs of surveillance and enforcement have been found to be non-trivial and
a cause for PAs ineffectiveness [59]. Additionally, many PAs face budget constraints,
which inhibit them from performing the needed enforcement activities [60,61]. Em-
pirical analyses have also found that, in particular when PAs are under-funded,
higher levels of enforcement improve conservation success, [41,62,63].
The law and economics literature demonstrates that costly enforcement typi-
cally implies that some illegal activity will optimally occur. This may be due to the
greater marginal costs versus benefits of deterring all such activity, or due to enforce-
ment budget constraints residing below the first-best level of enforcement. [64, 65]
The theory on natural resource extraction analyses, building on Becker’s [64] model
of incomplete enforcement, centralized versus decentralized protected-area manage-
ment and the role of penalties in a dynamic setting. [66]. In the lower income coun-
tries funding is typically insufficient to exclude people fully from the reserve. [67]
This literature also explores costly enforcement of private property rights on remote
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areas [68].
A series of related papers focuses on spatially explicit theoretical models of
resource extraction, where benefits vary with space for non-timber forest products
(NTFP) in PAs in developing countries. [69] This literature uses spatial economic
decision models of resource-dependent households to demonstrate how villagers re-
act to a reserve depending on the institutional and socioeconomic setting [70–74].
According to this literature, it may be best to forgo patrols in very remote (to
the extractor) areas, where villagers are unlikely to go, and to permit extraction
in some outer “buffer zone”, when facing a restrictive surveillance and enforcement
budget. [70]
Enforcement costs in developing countries are particularly high because trans-
portation infrastructure is frequently precarious [75]. These enforcement costs have
been found to be so important, that some suggest legalizing resource extraction by
selected groups or in selected locations, in exchange for enforcement private ser-
vices in hopes to reduce forest overall degradation [76]. The costs of surveillance
and enforcement have been found to be the bulk of the protected area budget in
remote and inaccessible areas [61, 75]. For example, a study of Colombian Natural
Parks, [61] found that, primarily because of limited accessibility, 67% of the studied
parks contained areas that had not been visited by guards for years. In some of
these parks, these unmonitored areas accounted for at least 50% of their territory.
Borner 2014 [77] develops a conceptual framework, and a spatially explicit
model, to analyze regulatory enforcement in the Brazilian Amazon, finding that
spatial patterns of both, deforestation and inspection costs, markedly influence en-
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forcement patterns. In a related paper, building on elements of optimal enforcement
theory, Borner 2015 [78] uses data collected from field-based forest law enforcement
operations in the Amazon region to develop a spatially explicit simulation model
for deforestation decisions in response to policy incentives and disincentives. The
research finds there are trade-offs between the cost-effectiveness of forest conser-
vation and landholder income. These papers however, do not look explicitly on
how enforcement costs vary with space and how this might affect the location of
deforestation. This study addresses this aspect.
In summary, drivers of deforestation have been prolifically studied, however
deforestation, and particularly illegal deforestation, continues to rise. The literature
on drivers of deforestation has recognized the importance of understanding the spa-
tial nature of these processes. The literature on policy evaluation recognizes that
policies are not enough to stop deforestation, and that governance and in partic-
ular surveillance and enforcement capacities of the implementing institutions play
a principal role on policy success. The research I undertake adds to this literature
by recognizing that governance variables, in particular surveillance and enforcement
costs, also depend on space, and as such, the expected spatial patterns of deforesta-
tion may be changed due to this relationship. The research explores this effect first
with a theoretical model and a numerical illustration, and then empirically, using
the Andean Region of Colombia as subject.
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Chapter 3: Colombian Context
I begin this chapter with a description of the Colombian institutional and
policy context and some of its shortcomings. Then I tackle drivers of deforestation
in the country. Finally, I explain the geographical delimitation of the study region.
3.1 Governance Structure of the Environmental Sector
Colombia is politically and geographically divided in 32 departments and 1101
municipalities. Each department elects its governor, likewise each municipality elects
its mayor democratically. Most of the municipalities have only one urban center,
which is called the “head” of the municipality, and where all the administrative
activity is located.
The two legislative pillars of Colombia’s current environmental management
system are the Constitution of 1991 and Law 99 of 1993. [79] A National Envi-
ronmental System (SINA, by its acronym in Spanish) was setup in the head of
the Ministry of the Environment (MADs by its acronym in Spanish), who is in
charge of generating and overseeing environmental policies. The whole country is
geographically divided in Autonomous Regional Corporations (CARs), roughly cor-
responding to the departments, which are in charge of implementing environmental
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policies guided by the MADs. CARs must coordinate with the municipalities and
departments to implement environmental norms. The responsibility of surveillance
and enforcement of environmental rules and policies is then locally shared by the
CARs, the departments and the municipalities. [80]
Funding for the municipalities comes principally from 3 sources, local taxes
(about 30%), royalties (about 15%) and central government transfers (about 45%).
Other funds include loans, co-financing projects and non-tributary income. The
tributary income includes property taxes, commerce and industry taxes and tax
on gasoline. Their spending/investment mostly falls into three categories: fixed
capital expenditure, human capital expenditure, and operations expenditure. The
central government’s budget transfered to the municipalities is managed by General
System of Participation (SGP, by its acronym in Spanish). The criteria for the
allocation of the resources are complex and mostly based on the increase in coverage
results of basic education and health services of the municipality. The environmental
expenditures of the municipalities are not accounted separately, so it is not possible
to know how much of their funds are destined to environmental purposes [81, 82].
The funds of the CARs include: a percentage of the tax property collected
by the municipalities, capital resources, taxes on energy generation and petroleum
extraction, effluent fees, and inter-institutional agreements. [82] CARs and munic-
ipalities are supposed to cooperate to facilitate environmental management, but
this is often not the case. Frictions exists between both of these institutions, since
some municipalities resist making full payments of property taxes to their CARs as
required under Law 99 of 1993. [79]
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3.2 Forest Management
Colombia has different types of figures to declare regional or national conser-
vation areas, including national parks, indigenous reserves, and forest reserves. The
forests reserves are one of the oldest and largest conservation figures and were cre-
ated by law 2 of 1954. These areas are subject to further zoning allowing for different
low impact activities, which must preserve forest cover. These reserves however, do
not fall only on public land and often property rights in these areas are not clear.
Internal zoning of the largest of these reserves was not approved until after 2010. In
the meantime, all productive activity in the forest reserves was banned.
Even though a Forestry Service is mentioned in several related policies since
1996, such service has been never designed or funded. This leaves forest reserves to
be managed principally under the authority of CARs and municipalities, as the law
99 of 1993 designates.
Specifically, the municipalities have the function of designing and implement-
ing the Territorial Planning Plans (POTs), in which the areas of conservation and
protection of natural resources in rural areas are delimited. These must respect the
declarations of regional or national conservation areas including forest reserves. The
forest reserves are under CARs’ and municipalities’ responsibility.
Unfortunately, the wide variety of environmental and forestry policies and reg-
ulations in Colombia are not consistently enforced subject to factors including low
levels of human and technical capacity, poor information systems, reliance on volun-
tary regulation, and inadequate regulations, among others. [79] Also municipalities,
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as well as several other government institutions, are underfunded for the large set
of responsibilities assigned to them by the numerous environmental policies and
regulations. [61,80,83]
According to estimates by Ucros 2008 [84], the area under forest reserves in
Colombia is approximately 51,289,400 ha, equivalent to about 45% of Colombian
terrestrial territory. However, according to the same source only 88.4% of the area
within the reserves is forested and about 15,915,338 ha of the country’s forested
land is outside the reserves. Despite regulation deforestation has been occurring
within and outside the reserves (see Figure 5.3 for a map of deforestation and forest
reserves in Colombia). From the set of municipalities with reserves (about 354),
more than 80% (288) are located in the Andean Region.
3.3 Environmental Information
Law 99 of 1993 designated the Hydrology, Meteorology, and Environmental
Studies of Colombia (IDEAM) as the entity in charge of producing and managing
environmental information. This system, although not perfect, compiles information
on national and regional levels from many sources. However, the system is rather
a compilation of systems still lacking comparability between data produced by the
several institutions. [79] Methodological standards or protocols for data collection
are lacking. Most of the deforestation information provided by the IDEAM was
funded by the Moore Foundation and its sustainability depends to date on the
success the IDEAM has at securing new funds for performing the classification
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process. Comparable environmental data or indicators at the municipality level
are still lacking. [82, 85] Moreover, producing such environmental information and
indicators is one of the many responsibilities assigned directly to municipalities.
3.4 Drivers of Deforestation
Deforestation rates in Colombia accelerated during the 2000s, particularly after
2007 [86]. It is in general agreed that most of the deforestation in Colombia has
a proximate (direct) cause of agricultural expansion [32, 87–89]. Forest cover lost
in the periods 2000 - 2005 and 2005 - 2010 was mainly transformed into pastures,
39.7% and 55.7% of deforestation was turned to pastures, respectively, followed
in importance by regrowth vegetation, 41.2% and 32.8% respectively. Although
pasture for livestock is the major direct cause of deforestation in Colombia [87],
as in most of the developing world, other direct causes also include agriculture,
illicit crops, mostly coca [90], mining, logging, natural fires, road construction, and
urbanization. Deforestation dynamics also vary by region [88,89].
A couple of studies have evaluated specific policies in the Colombian context.
Land titling to Afro-Colombian communities was found to be a significant deterrent
of deforestation when no illicit crops are present in the area, and was found to be
stronger in places closer to roads. [91] Additionally, a study focused on communal
land titling finds a reduction in deforestation only in the smaller areas, suggesting
that titling is effective only when the community is capable of monitoring the area.
[92]
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One of the direct drivers of deforestation mentioned often for Colombia are
illicit crops [89,93]. However, regional studies have found mixed evidence to support
that claim. Conversion to coca is found to be more probable farther from other crops
and from settlements. In contrast, proximity to other crops and to settlements
increases conversion to pasture. [94,95]
Colombia was also immersed in a perpetual rural civil war, which ended in
2016. Violent actions as well as the presence of armed groups deters any type
of legal activity. Farming becomes more costly, since farmers are threatened and
forced to pay fees to the insurgent groups to be able to perform their activities.
Local institutions loose their authority as well, since insurgent groups only abide
by their own law and threaten any organization or person who contradicts them.
Studying the potential effect of civil war on deforestation, warnings were published
predicting a spike in deforestation spurred by the peace accords. [86, 93, 96] The
recent deforestation spike in Colombia is evidence that these warning were well in
place.
3.5 Discussion of Political and Institutional Context
Colombian institutional and policy context displays some characteristics which
are worth describing as context to the empirical sections.
First, the environmental institutional organization is different and parallel to
the rest of the government arrangements. Although the municipality is the lowest
institutional level in charge of environmental policy enforcement, in general it shares
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this responsibility with the CARs and/or the departments. The regulation does not
clarify what the specific responsibility of each institution is, thus creating a gray
area where each institution decides whether it is their responsibility to take action
or not. Moreover, although forest and environmental policies often mention the
creation of a Forest Management Service, such an entity has never been funded
and does not exist. This void worsens the aforementioned situation particularly for
forest management responsibilities.
Second, and aggravating the situation above mentioned, the municipalities do
not receive funds specifically earmarked for environmental responsibilities, nor do
they have to report any environmental indicators to the central government. For
other sectors, such as education and health, the national budget allocated to the
municipality depends on the report and performance of specific indicators.
Third, environmental and land use priorities are principally reflected in the
Territorial Organization Plans (POTs) of the municipalities, which have to include
geographic environmental criteria defined for each region. The forest reserves are one
of several environmental restrictions and should be reflected in these plans. These
plans have to be approved by the CARs. But CARs have no way to make sure
these plans are respected. This is because CARs do not provide the municipality
with any funds to either help develop the POTs, nor to implement the territorial
organization reflected in the POT.
Fourth, although municipalities are the institutional unit closest to the ground,
often environmental matters are perceived to be at another level, namely the CARs
or the central government. Moreover, one of the CARs principal funding lines is
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a resource transfer from the property taxes in the municipalities in their region.
Although CARs are tasked to help the municipality plan for and address the munic-
ipalities environmental matters, municipalities are not accountable to CARs in any
of these matters and have ample leeway on whether to implement environmental
policy or not.
Lastly, fiscal capacity in Colombia is, in general, low. Municipalities, who
are in charge of collecting property taxes and maintaining property records perform
this task poorly. Moreover, Colombia has a very low fiscal performance compared
to other countries with large forest cover such as Brazil.
All of these situations are exacerbated by the presence of illegal groups, who
displace the State and usurp many of its functions in remote areas, imposing their
own law and order.
3.6 Geographical Delimitation of the Study Area
Colombia is recognized by its high biodiversity, following only by Brazil, in
number total of species, and ranking first in birds and amphibians. More than
half of the Colombian terrestrial territory is covered by forests (about 59 million
hectares) and it ranks third in South America in terms of forest area (after Brazil
and Peru). [97] These facts, combined with the multilevel decentralized management
of the environmental sector [80] in the country, makes it a suitable country to study
enforcement and deforestation patterns.
Due to the diversity of Colombian climates and reliefs, the country is divided
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into five geo-climatic regions: the Amazon, the Andean, the Pacific, the Orinoquia
and the Caribbean regions. The Amazon region is the one with the largest forest
area in the country. It is followed by the Andean Region with 18% of the country’s
natural forests. This region has the greatest variety of forest types due to the variety
of climatic conditions that compose it. Many of the forests are fragmented forests,
since this region is also the most densely populated. The Pacific Region, Orinoquia,
and Caribbean Region each have less than 10% of the forest area of the country.
To study enforcement as an underlying driver of deforestation, one needs an
area which is large enough to harbor diversity in institutional capacity, but also
consistent enough, that the processes driving deforestation are similar (for example
agricultural expansion). As noted in the literature review section, it is hard to find
measures of governance at a micro level. The most detailed institutional measure
available publicly in Colombia corresponds to municipalities.
I focus therefore this work on the Andean Region (see Figure 3.6), located in
the middle of the country, since it has a large number of relatively small munici-
palities. Moreover, it is the only one that has data on enforcement proxies for the
years corresponding to the deforestation data available. A large part of the coun-
try’s population lives in this region, and agricultural land is in high demand. Its
ecosystems and biodiversity, as well as the ecosystem services they provide are also
highly diverse and valuable. The landscape is a mix between natural land, agricul-
tural, urban and industrial development, corresponding to a “mosaic” area under
Chomitz et. al 2006’s classification [5].
About 25% of the countries’ deforestation is occurring in the Andes Region.
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This makes it, after the Amazon, the most endangered region for deforestation.
[89] Deforestation in the Andes also happens mostly in patches between 1 and 3
hectares, hinting a fragmentation process, rather than the expansion of the forest
frontier. Moreover, the remaining forests in the Andes are often of special interests,
as are Mountain Cloud Forests or Dry Tropical Forests, which are in high risk of
disappearing completely.
To be able to compare, I study both areas, within reserves, where deforestation
is not permitted, and also outside reserves, where deforestation is allowed only after
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Figure 3.1: Municipalities, Reserves and Andean Region
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Figure 3.2: Deforestation 2005-2010 (Source: IDEAM)
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Chapter 4: Theoretical Chapter
This section develops a theoretical model to study the spatial relationship be-
tween enforcement and surveillance costs, opportunity costs of conservation in the
form of forgone agricultural revenues, and land accessibility; and the effect that such
relation has on conservation outcomes. Its starts by describing the concept of acces-
sibility nd the framework of the model. Then it considers the benefits to farming and
how they vary with access difficulty, solving the problem from the perspective of the
farmer in a land lacking social policies. The next subsection introduces ecosystem
services and “costless” conservation policies, and solves the problem from the per-
spective of the central government representing society as a whole. The last section
recognizes that social policies have surveillance and enforcement costs, which vary
with space, and solves the problem from the implementation agency’s perspective,
showing how farmers react to such settings to produce different land use patterns.
4.1 Accessibility Framework
The model represents a town and the area around it - neighborhood. We define
s as the “access difficulty” or distance of any point in the neighborhood (of the town)
to the town. The concept of accessibility here takes into account not only the simple
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distance measurement, but also the added travel time due to existence and quality
of roads and roughness and slope of the terrain. The larger the distance, the steeper
the terrain, and the fewer or rougher the roads are, the lower the accessibility or the
higher the access difficulty, and thus the higher the s.
The town is defined as the principal market for the agricultural production and
also the administrative center of the neighborhood and is located at s = 0, which
is completely accessible. The furthest distance in the model, or the least accessible
land, is defined as S and any point further would correspond to another market
or administrative center. In the model a policy center, is also defined. This policy
center corresponds to a major city in the region, from where policies are dictated,
such center is assumed to be outside the region and outside the neighborhood [0, S]
(i.e. accessible area).
The land around the town has two principal uses: farming and conservation1.
Define l(s) as the total land (in hectares) at location (access difficulty) s from the
town. Let a(s) be the total farmed land (in hectares) at s and let n(s) be the land
(in hectares) with natural cover or in conservation at that same location. Since there
are only two possible uses for the land we have that l(s) = a(s) + n(s)∀s ∈ [0, S].




1Although it could be any other land use which provides local profits and entails a transport
cost to the market
2This function could be normalized to 1 and would correspond to a density function representing
the proportion of the total land located at each accessibility point.
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4.2 Agricultural Profit: the Farmer’s Perspective
When farmed, the land in the neighborhood has an in situ revenue r per
hectare, and in situ production cost c per hectare. The cost and the revenue per
hectare do not vary at different locations, because the land productivity in the region
is assumed to be similar.
Accessibility however, affects transportation costs. Define τ as output trans-
portation costs (per hectare at s). The total profit per hectare (π) at s would then
be π(s) = r − c− τ(s). We assume r − c > 0 in the neighborhood, such that there
is always profit from farming, not taking into account the transport costs.
As stated above, transport costs vary with accessibility, in particular, they are
higher for longer and more difficult trips to the market, therefore we have τs > 0.
Transport costs are always non-negative, reaching zero at the town (τ(0) = 0). Also,
τ(s)s→∞ =∞, meaning that if access difficulty increases, i.e. s increases indefinitely,
transportation costs increase indefinitely as well.
Without any applicable policies or enforcement, the farmers would decide how
much land a(s) to farm at each location s maximizing their total profit π(s)a(s).
Define â as the area the farmer decides to convert to farming in each location, such
that: â(s) = maxa(s)π(s)a(s). The solution to this maximization problem is the
farmer’s decision function that depends on s, with the following cases:
1. If π(s) = r − c − τ(s) > 0 or r − c > τ(s) then â(s) = l(s), the farmers will
convert everything at location s.
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2. If π(s) = r−c−τ(s) = 0 or r−c = τ(s) then the farmer is indifferent between
converting and not converting and he may farm anything between 0 and l(s).
We assume here that the farmers will not farm in this case.
3. If π(s) = r − c− τ(s) < 0 or r − c < τ(s) then â(s) = 0, the farmers will not
convert land because costs are larger than benefits.
The above conditions mean that, the farmer will farm all the area, if accessi-
bility is easy enough that transportation costs can be covered by revenues.
Since τs > 0 for all s, there exists only one distance s = ŝ such that: if s ≤ ŝ
then â(s) = 0 and if s < ŝ then â(s) = l(s). This is the farmers’ switching distance
and would correspond to the forest fringe. This location ŝ is the point at which
τ(s) = r − c, and we will assume that ŝ ∈ [0, S], such that the switching distance
for the farmer is inside the region S. A graph of the area that the farmer would
farm if left alone is presented in Figure 4.4, with value per hectare in the y-axis and
access difficulty in the x-axis. Profit is the dashed line and the area farmed would
correspond to all the area where profits are positive s < ŝ. At s = ŝ there are no
profits from farming, so it is assumed that at this point the farmer will not farm.
4.3 Ecosystem Services: the Social Problem
It is widely recognized that ecosystems provide benefits for society. These ben-
efits are for example: water-flow regulation (i.e prevention of droughts and floods),
and water purification (i.e. water quality), erosion and landslide prevention, carbon
sequestration, biodiversity conservation, among many others. While it is difficult to
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measure the value of these services, it is generally agreed that land under conserva-
tion produces more of these services than land in other uses, such as farming.
Thus, in the model, the land under conservation is assumed to produce ecosys-
tems services for the town, as well as for the policy center, in a higher degree than
farmland. For clarity, in this model we assume that the ecosystem benefits provided
are only received only by the town and the policy center and not directly by the
farmers.
The additional ecosystem services provided by one hectare of conserved land
as compared to the farmland is defined φ. To clarify this concept, take for example
the water provision service. The natural land stores water and delivers a constant
flow of ξ on average per hectare, this water can be used in the town and potentially
also at the policy center. The farmland, on the other hand, would extract water for
irrigation, for a value ι per hectare. Therefore, comparatively, the water provided
by the land would be φ = ξ+ ι. The same calculation can potentially be done for all
other ecosystem services with φ reflecting the value per hectare of the aggregation
of all of them. We assume φ > 0 for all the land in the region, so there is no change
in their value corresponding to the accessibility from the town, so φs = 0.
3
The individual decision made by the farmers does not take into account the
ecosystem’s benefits produced by the land when left in a natural state. If all the land
at location s is left natural (conserved) it would produce φl(s) ecosystem benefits
3Ecosystem services are very hard to measure and value and it is difficult to define how they
would vary with location [98]. Some argue that their value is higher the closer they are to the
people who enjoy them [99]; while others argue that the value is higher the more pristine, untouched
and therefore inaccessible the land is. Therefore, this model assumes that the value of ecosystem
services does not change with distance or access difficulty.
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as compared to the farmed alternative. So the benefits from not farming n(s) land
are φn(s). The decision makers at the policy site take the profits into account
when designing the conservation policies, in the form of protected area, but ignore
the enforcement and surveillance costs of such policy. Therefore, for each town
and neighborhood, policy makers maximize the benefits of farming and conserving




π(s)a(s) + φ[l(s)− a(s)]ds.
Because there is no interaction between the benefits and costs at different
accessibility points, and denoting the optimum or central conservation policy as
a∗(s) - land allowed to be farmed at s- we would have that the solution is again a
decision function, but for society, with:
1. If π(s) = r − c − τ(s) > φ or r − c > τ(s) + φ then a∗(s) = l(s), the farmers
are allowed to farm everything at distance s.
2. If π(s) = r−c−τ(s) = φ or r−c = τ(s)+φ society is indifferent to the farmer
farming or not farming at s. Here we assume that farmers would be allowed to
farm here, since society is indifferent between farming and not farming, while
the farmers have a direct benefits from farming.
3. If π(s) = r−c−τ(s) < φ or r−c < τ(s)+φ then a∗(s) = 0, the farmers are not
allowed to farm, because farming benefits do not outweigh the environmental
costs.
Since τs > 0 for all s, there exists one distance s = s
∗ such that: if s > s∗
then a∗(s) = 0 and if s ≤ s∗ then a∗(s) = l(s). This is the conservation policy
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switch location. Conservation would be then located away from the town in a
continuous area. A picture showing the area to be conserved under the central
policy is presented s ≤ s∗ in Figure 4.4 together with the profits from the farmer’s
profit and the ecosystem services line (dotted).
The amount of land in farming under the central conservation policy, is less
than without the policy. This is due to the positive transportation costs τs > 0 as
well as the positive ecosystem services φ > 0 such that s∗ < ŝ. Note that exactly at
s = ŝ we assume that farmer farms, since he has profits from farming, while society
is indifferent between farming and conserving.
4.4 Surveillance and Enforcement Costs: the Implementation Agency’s
Problem
Now we assume that we are between ŝ and s∗, here the farmer’s optimum is
different than the optimal social policy. In this region the farmer has an incentive
to farm at locations not permitted by the social policy â(s) ≥ 0 = a∗(s). This is
illustrated in Figure 4.4 s ∈ [s∗, ŝ].
The farmers’ decision changes in this case, when confronted with a protection
policy and its corresponding surveillance and enforcement activities. Importantly
however, protecting natural land from land conversion to farming, is costly to the
local administrative institution in charge of implementing such policy.
Let’s define ã(s) as the policy implemented under costly surveillance and en-
forcement costs. Also define e(s) as the probability that the farmer is caught farm-
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ing at a non-permitted location s. If the farmer is caught, at least he looses his
investment per hectare (c). While facing this risk the farmer has to choose between
complying and not complying with the policy. If the farmer complies he will just get
the benefits of farming what is allowed π(s)ã(s). If he does not comply and farms
the profitable area at location s he will gain π(s)l(s), if he is not caught, and he
will loose his investment cl(s) if he is caught. As is typical in developing countries
the model assumes not only enforcement costs are relatively high, but that fines are
relatively low [75].







To assure compliance it, the policy has to make complying have larger benefits
than not complying4, therefore the policy and enforcement frequency have to meet




Note that π(s)[l(s)− ã(s)] is the opportunity cost to the farmer if he complies
with policy ã, while [π(s) + c]l(s) is the opportunity cost to the farmer
Although the conservation policy a∗(s), defined by the center, it internalizes
the ecosystem service benefits provided by the natural land, it does not take into
account the enforcement costs that the local agencies in the town have to incur to
4Comply>Not comply, such that πã ≥ (1− e)πl − ecl, and eπl + ec ≥ πl − π − ã
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implement the policy. At the town however, the enforcement agency does not only
care about the ecosystem services but also recognizes the cost of enforcing the policy.
The enforcement effort has a positive cost k(s) > 0 at each location and the total
cost is also proportional to the size of the area to be monitored at each location l(s).
Since it is harder to get to locations further away, the surveillance and enforcement
cost is higher the more difficult it is to access the location ks > 0.
The implementing agency chooses the effort spent on enforcement e(s), to-
gether with the policy ã(s) it is willing to enforce. This effort (monitoring frequency)
can also be interpreted as probability to find the unlawful farming e(s). Assuming
that the implementation agency chooses enforcement at a level that ensures compli-
ance of its chosen policy level ã(s), and taking into account the enforcement cost,





π(s)a(s) + φ[l(s)− a(s)]− k(s)e(s)l(s)ds (4.2)
s.t. Equation 4.1.
The solution to this problem is again a decision function for ã(s) - area con-
served under costly enforcement and surveillance (as is shown in the Appendix A
and noting that π(s) + c = r − τ(s)):
1. If π(s) > φ − k(s)π(s)/[r − τ(s)],then ã(s) = l(s), and the farmers should
farm everything at location s. And the enforcement is ẽ(s) = 0.
2. If π(s) = φ−k(s)π(s)/[r − τ(s)] society is indifferent to the farmer farming or
not farming at s. And enforcement is ẽ(s) = π(s)[l(s)− ã(s)]/[r − τ(s)]l(s),
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depending on the area enforced.
3. If π(s) < φ − k(s)π(s)/[r − τ(s)], then ã(s) = 0, and the farmers should not
farm because farming benefits do not outweigh the environmental costs. And
enforcement is ẽ(s) = π(s)/[r − τ(s)].





Note that we assume that farmers do farm at s̃, since the implementation
agency is indifferent there between farming and conserving, while farmers have pos-
itive profit.
From this condition Equation 4.3 we can see that ẽ(s) = 0 when farming is
allowed (i.e ã(s) = l(s)). Also the enforcement and surveillance effort ẽ(s) has to
be higher at places with lower input costs c, because farmers have less to loose
when caught farming. Additionally, surveillance and enforcement effort is inversely
related to the total available area at s, since the larger the area the costlier the total
effort.
According to the decision functions above, a sufficient condition for the area









and in other areas enforce conservation with: ẽ(s) = π(s)/[π(s) + c].
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The area effectively conserved under costly enforcement would always be less
than the area than the central policy would would optimally seek to conserve. This
is because K(s) = k(s)
[π(s)+c]
> 0 for all s ∈ [s∗, ŝ]. Additionally, when adhering to the
above conditions, the area where policy is not enforced is equal or less than the area
that would be privately farmed, since enforcement will be done at places between s∗
and ŝ in which φ− k(s)
[π(s)+c]
> π(s) (compared to the previously conserved areas where
only φ > π(s)). The land strip between s∗ and ŝ, i.e. the land which should be
conserved in the social perspective, but is lost to farming when taking into account
costly surveillance and enforcement costs, depends on K(s). The strip is wider the
higher the surveillance costs k(s). The strip is also wider when c (i.e. the fine) is
lower, since the there is less to lose when caught farming.
An illustration of the scenario described above is presented in Figure 4.4,
above s∗ would de the area conserved under the social policy, but the area above s̃
(decision function 1) is the area effectively conserved under local enforcement and
surveillance equilibrium.
Importantly in this case, the decision function Q(s) is non-monotonic in s
because Q′(s) = π(s)K ′(s)+π′(s)(1+K(s)) can be positive or negative depending on




0 in our area of interest, since π(s) is decreasing in access difficulty and k(s) is
increasing in access difficulty. Then the first term in Q′(s) always positive and the
second always negative. Replacing terms, and dropping the dependence on s for














For the non-monotonicity of Q to occur Q(s)′ > 0 for some s and Q(s)′ < 0





(r − τ)2 + ck
(r − τ)2 − c(r − τ)
(4.6)
This shows that the likelihood of a reversal depends on the relation of the
rates of change of the transportation (profits) and the enforcement costs.
Because of the possible mon-monotonicity of the decision function, Q(s) = φ
could happen at more than one s̃ ∈ [s∗, ŝ]. This means, that a point in space
could exist within the socially optimal protected area, where the value of ecosystem
services does not outweigh the cost of enforcement plus the farming benefits, and
conservation will not be enforced anymore, allowing farming in remoter areas and
causing natural habitat fragmentation. This will be likelier at places where the
enforcement costs rise steeper than transportation costs with access difficulty. An
illustration the scenario described above is also shown in Figure 4.4, with the second
decision function, where there is a strip of land, above s̃ that again would be left to
farming by the enforcement agency, due to the non-monotonicity of Q(s).
There are several simplifying assumptions made in the analysis, which are
worth discussing before turning into the numerical simulation of the model. They
include: (1) the form of ecosystem services and (2) the form of farming revenues
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and costs.
If the ecosystem services were increasing instead of stable in space, leapfrogging
would be less probable. This because higher enforcement costs would be justifiable,
when higher ecosystem services values should be protected. The opposite would
happen if they were decreasing, such that leapfrogging would be more probable,
since enforcement costs might not the worth it in further distances, since there are
lower ecosystem services values to outweigh them.
The assumption of constant land productivity (r−c constant) is made here only
for convenience. The critical assumption is that π(s) is monotonically decreasing in
s. This could be the case not only if transportation costs increase with space but also
if revenues decrease with space or input costs increase with space. For decreasing
agriculture revenues in space, leapfrogging would be less probable, since there would
be less incentives to farmers to farm remotely. If the opposite would occur, and
revenues would be increasing in space (although hard to envision), the leapfrogging
would be more likely, since farmers would have more incentive to farm far away, and
te implementation agency might find it not worth it to protect these areas anymore.
Production costs change with space would mirror the effect of revenues.
Theory shows that in areas were deforestation is illegal, and competing oppor-
tunity costs are positive, unwanted fragmentation can occur. Therefore in reality,
following this model, either were land is protected or where the agricultural crop (or
alternative land use) is prohibited.
Within protected areas land fragmentation then could be more possible if
protected areas were delimited either a long time ago and the neighboring areas
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have faced development and population growth, or when the delimitation is made
not taking into account any of the local benefits the local population derive from the
use of these lands. Therefore, unrealistic or outdated protected area delimitation,
where forest does not exist anymore or other highly profitable activities are present
might render unwanted deforestation more likely. Fragmentation might happen
outside reserves when the forest depletion activity is outlawed, for example illegal
crops and or illegal mining. These activities, for their mere nature, are highly
profitable, again resulting in higher likelihoods of fragmentation. In the context of
Colombia we have both cases, in particular in the Andean Region (as noted in the
context chapter): forest reserves and coca and poppy crops.
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Figure 4.1: Unregulated equilibrium (s∗) vs social equilibrium (ŝ)
Figures
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Figure 4.2: Costly enforcement equilibrium, potential forest fragmentation
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Chapter 5: Parametrization: Potato Farming in the Colombian An-
des
5.1 Model Calibration
Although the theoretical model in Chapter 4 is applicable to any situation
where the implementation of land use policy is threatened by land conversion to
other illegal productive uses by local population, the case of potato cultivation areas,
in Antioquia and Narino departments of Colombia, is here presented to explore the
spatial patterns arising from costly surveillance and enforcement and to simulate
the features of the afore described theoretical model1.
The Colombian case fits the theoretical model well because environmental pol-
icy in Colombia is dictated from the central Ministry of the Environment and most
of its enforcement is delegated to Departmental Autonomous Environmental Cor-
porations and municipalities. Additionally the most present threats to Colombia’s
PAs and highly valuable ecosystem like the paramo are linked to agricultural and
pastoral uses [61]. Antioquia and Narino (see map 5.3) are two of the largest de-
partments in the Andean region of Colombia, characterized by broken landscapes
1Potato farming in the Andes Region in outlawed for paramo ecosystems as well as for many
of the remaining cloud forests
44
and difficult accessibility it particular away from the roads grid. Additionally, these
departments are important for agricultural production. They are two of the four
departments that account for more than 90% of the potato production in Colombia.
Both of these departments also have presence of protected areas, and specifically
also areas above 3000 meters over sea level, altitudes protected by law in the whole
country.
The following theoretical functions were calibrated using the available data
from these two departments. The details of estimation for the parametrization
can be found in the Appendix B. The base year used is 2005, since most of the
sparse information found for calibration is close to this year. All monetary units are
presented in US dollars.
The two principal components of the theoretical model which need to be
parametrized are: (1) the enforcement costs, (2) the profit function and the sim-
pler ecosystem services level. The theoretical and calibrated functions, parameters,
and corresponding values are shown in Table 5.1 and explained in the following
paragraphs.
The enforcement and surveillance costs, aggregate 4 components: trans-
portation costs (of the inspector), wages (of the inspector), hotel and food costs.
All these costs depend on the distance (or time) spent by the enforcement personnel
surveying each location. After estimating these costs, several (quadratic, cubic and
exponential) regressions were run using the distance from the administrative center
to all municipalities in Antioquia and Narino (estimated in Google maps) and ob-
45
taining an enforcement function depending on distance2. The quadratic option was
chosen for ease of computation, since it shows the same general behavior than the
others. Detail of this calibration process can be found in Appendix B. The best fit
was obtained with a constant k0 = 38 and a quadratic coefficient of k1 = 0.0025
over the distance.
The potato profit calculation has 3 major components: the revenue (r), the
input costs (c), and the output transport costs (τ(s)). The revenue was calculated
as price p times yield y available for Antioquia and Narino in Agronet, the Colombia
agricultural information system. The weekly potato prices reported, needed to be
averaged taking into account production varieties and seasonality, to reflect the
prices for the producer. A commercialization margin (M) also was deducted from the
profits, since the intermediaries in Colombia are reported to take a significant share
of the revenues [100–102]. The per ton input costs (γ) were estimated using data
from a detailed costs survey undertaken in 2009. The output transport costs were
calculated matching data produced by the Ministry of Agriculture on agricultural
transportation costs per ton between the principal cities of Colombia and Google
map distance. A regression was run to estimate the relationship between cost and
distance. The obtained fixed (F) and variable (t) transportation costs are also shown
in table 5.1 above. Further estimation details are included in the Appendix B.
The value of local ecosystem services is difficult to estimate and depends
on many geographical and biological characteristics of the area. Ecosystem services
2Google map can only calculate distances on the roads grid, so municipality centers were used,
the costs of surveillance should increase much more steeply when parcels are located away from
roads and surveillance has to be done by foot or other transportation method
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could theoretically be either increasing or decreasing in distance [98,99]. Given the
characteristics of the area studied the most prevailing ecosystem services are: water
provision and regulation, carbon sequestration, flood prevention, erosion prevention,
and biodiversity habitat support [103]. Estimates for these services in the areas of
interest are scarce, and are very variable [104–106]. Based of the estimates from
the study on protected areas by [106], and taking into account only potable water,
tourism, and carbon sequestration, the per hectare value of ecosystem services could
vary between 320 US$/ha and 560 US$/ha. This ranges only take 3 ecosystem
services into account, such that they are likely underestimating the value. Moreover,
information on how these ecosystem services values vary with distance is almost
inexistent. Therefore, and consistent with the theoretical framework, a constant
value of ecosystem services is used here. In this simulation therefore, values around
500 US$/ha are used.
The profit, decision function, and ecosystem services are shown in Figure 5.3
for the base case values in Table 5.1. Here the policy is effectively enforced in most
of the area where it is socially optimal too do so, and only a small strip near the PA’s
border is allowed to be farmed due to costly enforcement costs which outweigh the
benefits to society of preserving that strip. Therefore, the switch between agricul-
tural and natural land, does not occur because farming is not profitable anymore at
that distances, but because for the enforcement agency it is optimal to preserve this
land for their ecosystem services, given the enforcement costs. As can be observed
Figure 5.3 these calibrated values do not initially show a fragmented conservation
land use pattern. However, as will be shown later in this chapter, the fragmented
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(leapfrogging) conservation pattern may arise under plausible contexts with different
parameters for agricultural transportation and surveillance and enforcement costs.
5.2 Sensitivity Analysis
Although the base case parametrization in the last section shows a classic
pattern, where farming happens close to the center and natural land is effectively
conserved far away from the center, similar to the case where the social optimal
policy is perfectly enforced, a sensitivity analysis was performed to characterize cases
where a fragmented pattern could occur. The analysis focuses on the parameters
accompanying the variable enforcement costs (k1) and transport costs (t), as they
are the ones more closely connected to the distance (access difficulty) variable. The
parametrized decision function (Q) in terms of these two variables is the following:
Q(k1, t, s) =
k1s
2(st− 29)− 20s2t2 + 4099st− 102051
st− 174
(5.1)

















By replacing different values for t and k1 different forms of the decision function
and its derivative arise. In figure 5.3 the decision function for different values of k1
and t is presented. Figures B.3 and B.4 in Appendix B show the corresponding
derivatives of Q. The patterns arising depend on three parameters t and k1, but
also the maximum distance S = 500, since we only care about the form of Q within
the neighborhood around the administrative center.
To ease the discussion, I label s1 and s2, with 0 < s1 < s2 as the points, if
existing, where Q′(s) = 0. They correspond to the extreme points in the decision
function. I also label s0 the positive point at which Q
′′(s) = 0, if it exists. This is
the point at which the derivative of the decision function reaches its maximum.
Figure 5.5 summarizes the results from the sensitivity analysis on t and k1.
Four different areas are differentiated:
Let farm (A), when t << k1, here enforcement costs are high and transporta-
tion costs rise very slowly. For these areas the decision function, although it starts
decreasing Q′ < 0, it quickly shifts upward Q′ > 0 and does not come back down.
Only s1 is an element of [0, 500]. Here, farming is profitable even in the most re-
mote areas, while enforcement is impossible due to its large and increasing costs.
Unless ecosystem services increase with distance, the optimal enforcement policy
here would result in conserving close to the town and letting farm away from the
town.
Simple fragmentation (B), when t < k1, here enforcement costs are high and
transportation costs are close below them. For these areas the decision function
also starts decreasing Q′ < 0 and later shifts upward Q′ > 0. As in (A) s1 is an
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element of [0, 500], but also s0 is within the area. More importantly, these cases
also display larger s1, allowing the decision function to decrease closer to the town
for longer. Therefore, these cases start similar to the Fragmentation (C) case. The
farmers might be left to farm close to the town, at least for a little part, then
enforcement of protection could come in place. Further away though, and for all
the rest of the region, farming would be allowed again, because of the sharper
increase of the enforcement costs with distance, as compared to the slow increase
in the transportation costs. Here, the decision function, as in case (A) does not
come back down within the area of interest. Both cases (A) and (B) could happen
at municipalities with very high agricultural productivity, or with transportation
costs that are slowly increasing or independent of space, for example illicit crops,
and with highly increasing enforcement costs, for example if these areas also have
violent conflict present.
Complex Fragmentation (C), when k1 > t but k1 ≈ t , here enforcement costs
are high, but do not increase as sharply as in (A) or (B). This means that the
decision function starts decreasing Q′ < 0 for a substantive portion of the area,
later shifts upward Q′ > 0, but within the area of interest it shifts back down,
Q′ < 0. This means that s1 and s2 are both elements of [0, 500], as well as s0.
Farming is then profitable enough to be done close to the town, then conservation
becomes important, but enforcement costs render enforcement impossible in remoter
places, and fragmentation occurs. However, as opposed to the cases in (B), in this
case, at the furthest distances, farming becomes nearly unprofitable and ecosystem
services are so high that it becomes again important to conserve. Therefore the
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furthest areas are again forested.
Classic (D), when t >> k1, here enforcement costs are not high enough to
outweigh the increase in transportation costs so the driving force for the decision
function is the agricultural profits. This case corresponds to the base case, where
only a strip of land of socially optimal land to conserve (and adjunct to the agri-
cultural land) is lost due to enforcement costs. Here Q′ < 0 throughout the area of
interest. In these cases, there is a large connected area of natural land conserved
by the policies and effectively enforced by local institutions and far away from the
town.
I also calculate condition in equation 4.6 in terms of t and k1:
k′
τ ′
≤? ≥ (r − τ)
2 + ck





2 + s2t2 − 390st+ 383404
s2t2 − 224st+ 5655
(5.5)
Results of the sensitivity on the condition are presented in Figure 5.4. For
fragmentation to occur one needs k′/τ ′ the red line, to be higher than the blue line,
within [0, S]. If this does not happen, we are in the classic case (D), where we
only loose a strip of land due to enforcement costs. However, in all the rest of the
cases, illegal deforestation could be allowed in remote places, because if the high
enforcement costs related to preventing it.
From Figure 5.3 it is clear that the non-monotonicity of the decision function
and its behaviour within the area of the neighborhood, is not the only determinant
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of fragmentation. The Ecosystem Services level has to be comparable to the level
where the non-monotonicity of the decision function.3 To explore conditions needed
for the level of ecosystem services (ES) to fall within the range where the non-
monotonicity of the decision function curve occurs, Descartes Rule was applied to
SF − ES = 0 (see Appendix B).
Using the calibrated parameters this means that ES need to be below 568
US$/ha approximately for a leapfrogging pattern to occur.
5.3 Discussion
The model shows that where agriculture is profitable, but illegal, and because
enforcement costs also depend on difficulty of access, forest fragmentation (i.e.non-
monotonic effect of accessibility on deforestation) might occur. The analysis shows
that fragmentation is more likely at places which high or steeply incrementing en-
forcement costs or high or slowly decreasing profits (i.e. high or slowly increasing
transportation costs). Here I present some discussion about the factors which might
affect both of these costs.
First, it is important to note that the calibration here presented only included
Google Map“accessible” locations, and most of these locations are relatively easy
to access, since they are on the roads network. In reality, remote areas are much
less accessible: steep slopes and dirt roads or absence of roads make surveillance
3Not that here the ecosystem services are the ones determining the policy decision from the
central government, however, there are many other ways to decide what areas should and should
not be protected. The enforcement costs affect the pattern of deforestation of any type of protection
policies, which need to be locally enforced.
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and enforcement activities harder to undertake. The terrain conditions require high
performance all-wheel drive vehicles, mule or donkey trains, or sometimes even foot.
The time, and therefore the costs to access these locations, are therefore likely much
higher than estimated in the calibration model.
Additionally, between the 2000 and 2010 Colombia was immersed in civil war.
The guerrillas took over large peaces of the territory and maintained their governance
through violent actions. These places were generally hard to access, and away
from roads. Monitoring places where the guerrillas were present could potentially
be prohibitively high, since nobody dares to go into these locations. Moreover,
insurgent groups were also recognized drug dealers, and illicit crops were present
in their territories. Transportations costs in these areas would be higher than the
calibrated ones in this section.
Those two factors however, might increase both transportation and enforce-
ment costs in reality. Deficient or inexistent road infrastructure, geographical or
ecological hurdles like broken terrain or dense forests, hard to transverse and with
low visibility, and violent conflict, make moving in general harder.
However, the following are some factors which might result in higher or more
steeply increasing enforcement costs as compared to transportation costs. First, the
over use of precarious conservation policies as are protected areas, which focus on
keeping the local people out of these areas render enforcement costs very high, as
compared to less extreme land uses, like silvo-pastoral alternatives, non-timber forest
product extraction, or any mixed use landscape. Second, the low knowledge of the
terrain by enforcement officers, which make it much more difficult to transverse as
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opposed to the common dwellers. Third, precarious local monitoring technologies,
which rely on personal revisions. Forth, disorganized ad-hoc local implementation
agencies, with untrained personnel. Fifth, lack of environmental information in local
institutions making them prone to regulatory capture and corruption.
Additionally, this model can also be applied to areas were most farming is
unprofitable but illegal crops still represent high benefits. In particular, for farmer
of illegal crops, often the transportation costs is taken over by the commercialization
agent, who picks the product up at the farm gate. In these areas, the policies outlaw
this type of farming, and local agencies are in charge of enforcing these policies.
However, illegal farming profits might outweigh the costs of being caught, given the
probability of enforcement implementation is areas far away from the administrative
center.
In summary I find that (1) land fragmentation might occur (i.e.the effect of
accessibility on deforestation may be non-monotonic spatially) when enforcement
is costly and (2) fragmentation is more likely to occur when enforcement is more














Figure 5.1: Map of selected departments in Colombia
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Figure 5.2: Base case: profit (π) decision function (Q) and ecosystem services (φ)
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Figure 5.3: Decision function
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Figure 5.4: Sensitivity on the condition (eq. 4.6) for the slope of the derivative of
the decision function
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A: Let Farm Q′ < 0, Q′ > 0; s1 ∈ [0, S]
B: Simple Fragmentation Q′ < 0, Q′ > 0 and Q′′ = 0; s1 and s0 ∈ [0, S]
C: Complex Fragmentation Q′ < 0, Q′ > 0, Q′ < 0 and Q′′ = 0; s1, s2 and s0 ∈ [0, S]
D: Strip lost to farming Q′ < 0
Figure 5.5: Sensitivity to transport costs (t) and enforcement costs (k1)
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Tables
Table 5.1: Calibration Summary
Theoretical Component Functional Form Parameter Value Units
Enforcement Cost (k(s)) k0 + k1s
2
Linear component k0 38 US$
Quadratic component k1 0.0025 US$/km
2
Revenue (r) p(1−M)y
Yield y 20 Ton/ha
Output price p 210 US$/Ton
Commercial margin M 10 %
Input Cost (c) γ ∗ y
Input per unit cost γ 145 US$/Ton
Output Transport Cost (τ(s)) (F + ts)y
Variable t 0.06 US$/Ton/km
Fixed F 15 US$/Ton
Ecosystem Services (φ) ES ES 500 US$/ha
Neighborhood (S) S S 500 km
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Chapter 6: Empirical Methodology and Data Description
In the theory section (Chapter 4), I model the possibility of forest fragmen-
tation (a reversal o break in the von Thunen pattern of illegal deforestation) and
propose that this phenomenon could be explained by high or steeply rising costs of
the monitoring and enforcement activities. Therefore, in this chapter I empirically
investigate, first, if access difficulty may produce forest fragmentation; and second,
if this fragmentation is more likely to occur where enforcement is more costly. I
propose to investigate both of these questions using two approaches: (1) a cubic
function of access difficulty interacted with a measure of enforcement capacity and
(2) non-parametrically using indicators for discrete ranges of access difficulty, again
interacted with a measure of enforcement capacity.
In the first part of this chapter I present the deforestation data obtained and
the sampling methods used. Then I describe the access difficulty variable con-
structed and the enforcement proxy utilized. I continue describing the econometric
model, non-parametric approach, and explain the control variables included. Finally,
I go over the robustness checks performed. At the end of the chapter I provide the
descriptive statistics tables. I include more detailed comparative statistics tables in
Appendix C.
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6.1 Deforestation and Sampling
Official data on forest and non-forest areas were estimated by the Institute of
Hydrology, Meteorology, and Environmental Studies of Colombia (IDEAM) and are
available at pixel level for the whole country at Landsat scale (i.e.30mx30m) for the
years: 2000, 2005 and 2010. These maps are calculated based on satellite images
following the “Digital Image Processing Protocol for the Quantification of Defor-
estation in Colombia at National level - Thick and Fine Scale” protocol. The forest
and non-forest data comes classified as: 1 (forest), 2 (non-forest) and NA (clouds),
for each of the available years. This allowed me to calculate a deforestation panel
dataset at that same resolution, with two deforestation periods: from 2000 to 2005
and from 2005 to 2010. I constructed a two period binary pixel level deforestation
dataset, with 0 representing stable forested land for each period and 1 representing
a deforestation event, NA is assigned to all other pixels.
The Andean Region in Colombia has an area of approximately 310,000 km2,
covering about 30% of the country. At the resolution of the deforestation data,
this would be about 350 million pixels. In this region about 30% is forest, and
average deforestation was 5% and 6% in the periods of 2000 to 2005 and 2005 to
2010 respectively, see table 6.2.
Running a regression for the whole deforestation dataset would be computa-
tionally non-viable, so I followed the most recent literature on drivers [3] and policy
evaluation [35] and worked with samples. I drew two samples on a rectangle area
covering the Andes Region: a grid sample, every 1 km, resulting in a total of 867,776
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pixels and a random sample with 1 million pixels. Within these rectangles the pixels
corresponding to the Andean Region were 319,770 for the grid sample, and 368,522
for the random sample. Moreover, I included only pixels which where forested in
year 2000, reducing the samples to 104,543 for the grid sample and 120,323 for the
random sample. These samples can be further split into pixels within reserves, and
pixels in non-protected to perform the analyses.1
In table 6.2, I present statistics of the average illegal deforestation calculated
for reserves and unprotected areas, for each of the samples (i.e. random and grid)
in each of the available periods. We can observe that deforestation is between
5% (2000 to 2005) and 4% (2005 to 2010) in the reserves, and about 8% in non-
protected areas. While the sampling procedure is different in the two samples, the
deforestation statistics are almost exact between the grid and the random samples.2
6.2 Econometric Specification
The econometric model uses pixel/parcel level deforestation as dependent vari-
able, controlling for the effect of different deforestation “drivers”3. The principal
regression run is a linear probability model (LP).
The dependent variable I use for deforestation, yijt, is binary, showing 0 when
forest is constant on pixel i and 1 if that pixel is deforested, in municipality j in
period t. I run a two period fixed effects linear probability model, with the following
1The final sample is less than these numbers because of missing values for some of the other
variables in the regressions.
2This is true for all the other variables as well
3See [35] or Chapter 3 for a description of the pertaining literature.
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form:4












′ + aj + bt + uijt (6.1)
The independent variables will be explained in detail in the following para-
graphs.
6.3 Access Difficulty
Variable dij denotes difficulty of access to roads for pixel i in municipality
j. Access to roads is identified in the literature as an important underlying driver
of deforestation, [12, 107, 108] mainly because it affects agricultural profit through
transportations costs. Here, according to the theory in Chapter 4, I use it to also
explore the possibility of a reversal on this von Thunen effect, potentially related to
enforcement and surveillance costs.
The access difficulty measure was calculated based on the roads’ map available
from the National Geographical Institution (IGAC) and the slope calculated from
the digital elevation data DMI. For each pixel, I calculated access difficulty to roads
with ArcGis software and its tool least cost path5. This tool uses a costs’ surface,
4 ′ is used to denote the vectors.
5 https://pro.arcgis.com/es/pro-app/help/data/imagery/least-cost-path-global-function.htm
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in this case the slope layer, because it proxies the effort a person has to make when
walking through it (i.e. the steeper the slope, the harder the effort to traverse the
pixel walking). Thus, the cost of a route between each pixel and the road consists
of the sum of all the cost values of the consequent pixels of the route one would
have to transverse to travel from the pixel to the road. The tool is able to pick from
all the possible routes, the shortest one (minimum value), and assigns this value to
the pixel. This value was then divided by the largest value in the dataset to obtain
a 0-1 measure of access difficulty, since values were extremely large (since it is a
sum through all pixels in the route of distance km times slope degrees) and would
render very small coefficients. To show the variability of the calculated measure in
the datasets histograms for access difficulty in each of the samples are presented
in Figure 6.7 where 1 is the less accessible land and 0 would be the point at the
road. Thus, access difficulty is interpreted similar to distance (i.e. it is a weighted
distance), where the high values mean the most remote unapproachable lands.
This variable is included in the regressions in squared and cubic form, to allow
for the nonlinear relationship with deforestation. If these coefficients are significant
in the regressions there may be a non-linear pattern of deforestation over the access
difficulty measure.
An alternative access difficulty measure used as robustness check is simply the
shortest linear distance from each pixel to the road. This distance is also calculated
by the ArgGis software with the tool shortest distance. The averages of these two
access measures can also be found for each sample in each period in table 6.2. Other
linear distances were also calculated using ArcGis software and included as controls
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in the robustness checks: distance to CAR (environmental administrative center,
see Chapter 3) distance to principal road, and distance to municipality center, since
they could affect both deforestation and enforcement measures.
6.4 Enforcement Capacity
The term xjt represents the enforcement capacity of municipality j in period t.
In this analysis the Municipal Fiscal Performance Index (FPI) was used as a proxy
of enforcement capacity. This variable varies with time, but is the same for all the
pixels within a municipality.
Law 617 of 2000 establishes to the National Planning Department (DNP)6 the
task of evaluating the fiscal performance of the municipalities. This entity started
calculating the Fiscal Performance Index in 2000 and has been performing it yearly
ever since. The Fiscal Performance Index is mostly based on a self reported budget
information and complemented with data reported to the Office of the General
Comptroller of the Republic. The index is then used by the DNP in municipal
evaluations and is taken into account in the decision to assign central resources to
the different municipalities.
The measure is a yearly municipality level index. Its purpose is to measure the
capacity of the municipalities to manage their funds in a productive and transparent
manner. The FPI ranges from zero to one hundred points, where zero is the lowest




• Capacity to self-finance their operation: The self-financing of the operating
expenses indicator measures what part of the general payroll and operating
expenses of the municipality is covered by the resources of free destination.
The information is obtained from the budgetary executions reported to the
DNP.
• Debt support: The debt support indicator is obtained as the proportion of
total debt over disposable income. It is expected that the total debt does not
compromise the municipality’s liquidity.
• Degree of dependence on government transfers and royalties: It measures the
importance of central government’s resources, in relation to the total income
of the municipality. Their magnitude reflects the degree to which transfers are
the fundamental resources to finance municipal government activities.
• Effort to strengthen fiscal resources, generation of own resources: Reflects the
relative weight of local tax revenues in total current income. This is a mea-
sure of the fiscal effort made by the municipality and reflects the importance
of local tax management resources against other external sources of current
expenditure financing.
• Magnitude of public investment: Quantifies the degree of investment made
by the municipality, with respect to total expenditure (including operational
and administrative personnel costs). For the calculation of this indicator,
investment is understood as not only the gross formation of fixed capital, but
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also as what is called social investment, which includes the salaries of doctors
and teachers, training, subsidies, and school endowments, regardless of funding
sources.
• Savings capacity: Is the balance between current income and current expenses
and it is equal to current savings as a percentage of current income. This
indicator is a measure of the solvency of the territorial entity to generate own
surpluses that are can be destined for investment.
All these indicators are aggregated by the technique of principal components
analysis and the value of the first component is defined as the FPI.7 A high measure
for the municipalities in FPI means: 1) enough resources to sustain their operation,
2) adequate capacity to support debt, 3) important level of own resources (tax sol-
vency) as counterpart to government transfers, 4) effective fiscal effort for financing
their development plans, 5) high levels of investment as compared to operating costs,
and 7) adequate saving capacity to assure future solvency.
The overall FPI measure, which accounts for the factors listed above, proxies
then the ability of the municipality to manage their budget. In this sense, it also
proxies the general capacity of the municipality to perform its responsibilities. One
such responsibility is to monitor illegal deforestation and enforce conservation poli-
cies. Moreover, if the municipality is able to efficiently manage its resources, it may
7Principal component analysis is a statistical procedure that uses an orthogonal transformation
to convert a set of observations of possibly correlated variables into a set of orthogonal variables
called principal components. This transformation is defined in such a way that the first principal
component has the largest possible variance, that is, it accounts for as much of the variability in
the data as possible. This first component is then chosen to represent most of the information in
the set of variables
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also have the leeway to assign more resources (personnel and working capital) to
environmental monitoring and enforcement activities.
The fiscal performance index is available yearly, I chose observations from 2000
and 2005 to match with the deforestation data, to help avoid inverse causality. See
table 6.2 for means of these variables in each sample and year.
To study the effect that municipal enforcement might have on the pattern of





and the enforcement measure xjt are included in the regressions. If these terms are
significant, there would be evidence to say that the pattern of deforestation changes
with enforcement level, as the theory in Chapter 4 suggests.
To better visualize the effects of enforcement, the predictive margins for the
prediction along the access difficulty measure, and their 95% confidence intervals for
different levels of the enforcement proxy, are graphed. Although I do not directly
have a variable of enforcement costs changing with access difficulty, with this inter-
actions analysis, I am able to assess if municipalities which have higher enforcement
capabilities are also less likely to present the reversal in the pattern of deforestation.
I am also able to compare this effect within reserves and in non-protected areas,
expecting the effect of enforcement capacity to be stronger inside the reserves.
6.5 Non-parametric Analysis
To address the possibility that the results are driven by the selection of the
polynomial functional form, I also perform a non-parametric approach constructing
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sets of indicators for discrete ranges of access difficulty and running the regressions
with these indicators and their interactions with the enforcement proxy. Thus,




ijδ3 in the regressions, I use the terms D
′
ij ∗∆′+
D′ij ∗ xjtΓ′, where D′ij is the a vector for each observation, with length equal to the
number of discrete ranges (bins) of access difficulty chosen, displaying 1 only for the
range in which the distance of this specific observation falls into and 0 for the rest
of the vector. ∆′I and Γ
′
I are the corresponding coefficients for the indicators and
their interactions with the enforcement proxy variable respectively. To visualize
the results, again the predictive margins and their 90% confidence intervals are
calculated at each of the dummies for each different level of the enforcement proxy.
6.6 Controls
To control for other underlying drivers of deforestation, [3,32] geographical and
municipality level data, were matched to the deforestation data. Most of these vari-
ables affect the costs of farming and therefore deforestation. In the next subsections,
I describe each of the factors included in the regressions and their sources.
6.6.1 Geophysical Controls
Some of the most important indirect drivers of deforestation, as they are fac-
tors which affect agricultural productivity, correspond to geological (i.e. altitude
and slope) and climatic (i.e.temperature and precipitation) variables. [12, 32, 109] I
matched these variables, a vector (z′i) of geophysical characteristics, which vary by
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pixel/parcel but not with time, including: slope, elevation, temperature, precipita-
tion and soil type, geographically to the deforestation samples.
The elevation variable is available from DEM SRTM (CIAT) at a 1km resolu-
tion. From these data, I also calculated with ArcGis Software the slope measure in
degrees, statistics are shown in table 6.2.
The data for climatic variables were available from the IDEAM in the form
of geographical polygons corresponding to precipitation and temperature ranges.
Additionally, data on soil types, in geographical shape format, were available also
from IGAC. The IGAC classifies soils according to their geomorphological charac-
teristics and their physical, chemical and mineralogical properties. These data were
geographically matched to the deforestation panel and later included as categorical
variables in the econometric work. Frequency statistics are presented in tables 6.3,
6.4 and 6.5.
6.6.2 Municipality Controls
To account for unobservable cross sectional variation that might affect defor-
estation and the enforcement proxies simultaneously, I include a municipality fixed
effect aj. I also include a time effect bt to capture the general time trend. My iden-
tification assumption is the nonexistence of unobservable effects that vary both over
time and by municipality, and that are simultaneously associated with the enforce-
ment proxies. However, there may be many other phenomenon which could affect
the enforcement capacity of the municipality and deforestation simultaneously, in
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particular at municipal level. I included some of them to check the robustness of the
results. All these control variables, w′jt, are available at municipal level j, but not
at pixel level and vary with time t. Their means are included for the two samples
and the two years in table 6.2.
Population is one of the most studied variables in relation with deforestation
[3,28,33]. However, it is still not completely understood if deforestation permits new
settlers to come to places they could not come to before, or more people moving in
means higher demand for land, thus more deforestation. Importantly, population
growth can also affect enforcement capacity in several ways, if there are more people
under the jurisdiction of the same institutions, the institutions personnel may not
be enough, to manage, and avoid, the (negative) effects of a larger population. On
the other side, more people also means more “eyes”, and they could also help to
monitor the municipality area even if not hired. Rural population is available from
the National Statistics Department (DANE) institute as well as the official area, so
rural population density was calculated.
Colombia faced a more that 50 year-long civil war, until 2016, when President
Juan Manuel Santos and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC-EP)
signed a peace agreement that officially ended the armed conflict. The armed con-
flict relationship with deforestation has been studied, and in Colombia, the conflict
may reduce deforestation probability [86]. It is not clear if this effect is due to the
violent groups directly protecting the forest or if it is a secondary effect of people
and farmers fleeing or avoiding the areas where conflict is more prone. Additionally,
areas directly affected by armed conflict might also have less institutional capac-
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ity. The guerrillas often overtook power in the municipalities and did not allow the
municipal authorities to perform their duties. Moreover, remoter areas of the mu-
nicipality could loose municipal government control altogether. Number of Conflicts
per municipality per year is available from the IGAC and was used to control for
these effects.
Deforestation might be driven by private farmers or companies in need for
productive land, as well as by small settlers, who might be pushed off the better
land and driven to cut forest to survive [6]. Inequality in land distribution, could
proxy any of these phenomena. Inequality however, also might affect municipalities’
enforcement capacity. Wealthy players can influence the municipal government, if
they are not members of the government themselves. This influence might render
the government institutions: either more capable, once money and royalties are
received, or, inadequate, when bribes and corruption are present. Inequality in
rural land distribution was calculated yearly per municipality between 2000 and
2009, by Ibanez et. al. [110] and pasted geographically to the dataset for the years
2000 and 2005.
To avoid inverse causality, for the variables that are fixed over time, I used
measures at the beginning or before 2000 only, and for the time varying variables, I
picked the measures closest to the start of the period (i.e. 2000 and 2005).
The random error is denoted by uijt and α is the intercept.
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6.7 Robustness
The effect of enforcement on the deforestation pattern was explored for areas
within forest reserves and in non-protected areas, to observe if the effect of the
enforcement proxy varies. The regressions were also run for both samples (i.e. grid
and random), to make sure the effect is not observable only on a specific set of
observations. Regressions are also presented with and without municipal level time
varying controls and with and without other linear distance controls.
The linear probability regressions were run with robust standard errors to
account for possible heteroskedasticity. After running the LP regressions, logit re-
gressions, their average marginal effects, and the standards errors are calculated for
































             Grid Sample                                                 Random Sample
Not Protected Reserves
Figure 6.1: Access difficulty histograms, grid and random samples, re-






























Fiscal Performance Index Histograms
             Grid Sample                                                 Random Sample
Not Protected Reserves
Figure 6.2: Fiscal performance index histogram
76
Tables
Table 6.1: Regional Deforestation Statistics
Total Area Forested Area within Region Deforested Area within Region
beginning of the period per period
Area (km2) (th. pixels) (% or area) (th. pixels) (% forested) (th. pixels) (km2)
Period 2000-2005
Andina Region 313,510 348,345 33% 113,693 5% 6,140 5,636
Not Protected 237,788 264,209 25% 65,078 6% 4,127 3,788
Reserves 75,723 84,136 58% 48,615 4% 2,013 1,848
Period 2005-2010
Andina Region 313,510 348,345 29% 100,236 6% 5,915 5,430
Not Protected 237,788 264,209 22% 56,848 7% 4,167 3,826
Reserves 75,723 84,136 52% 43,388 4% 1,747 1,604
Note: Calculated from IDEAM data
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Table 6.2: Sample averages of the dependent variables and the controls
Not Protected Reserves
Year 2000-2005 2005-2010 2000-2005 2005-2010
Sample Grid Random Grid Random Grid Random Grid Random
Deforestation (0-1) 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04
Access difficulty/Remoteness
Walking effort (0-1) 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19
Distance to Road (km) 4.37 4.38 4.32 4.31 9.11 9.12 9.17 9.19
Fiscal Performance Index (%) 53.60 53.61 58.54 58.58 52.80 52.82 57.99 57.96
Number of Violent Conflicts 3.51 3.55 5.52 5.55 2.92 2.93 6.60 6.54
Land Owner GINI (0-1) 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67
Rural Population
Density (#persons/km2) 18.63 18.70 18.46 18.62 13.16 13.10 12.92 12.97
Linear Distance to Municipality’s
Urban Center (km) 14.58 14.57 14.62 14.59 23.34 23.40 23.41 23.42
Linear Distance to
Principal Road (km) 17.85 17.93 17.98 18.00 28.61 28.62 29.20 29.16
Slope (degrees) 17.65 17.69 17.61 17.62 17.11 17.08 17.00 16.97
Elevation (m) 1515 1515 1490 1485 1407 1406 1376 1377
Observations 54001 62245 47029 54448 36615 41992 32933 37823
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Table 6.3: Precipitation sample frequencies (%) for average yearly precipitation
ranges
Not Protected Reserves
Sample Grid Random Grid Random
500 to 1000 mm 1.03 1.04 0.02 0.03
1000 to 1500 mm 11.78 11.53 10.21 9.99
1500 to 2000 mm 21.91 22.06 19.6 19.76
2000 to 2500 mm 18.22 18.21 17.7 18.03
2500 to 3000 mm 17.1 17.23 19.78 19.92
3000 to 3500 mm 19.28 19.31 16.85 16.78
3500 to 4000 mm 9.95 9.84 10.74 10.43
4000 to 4500 mm 0.52 0.57 4.54 4.53
4500 to 5000 mm 0.1 0.11 0.52 0.53
5000 to 7000 mm 0.03 0.02 0 0
Table 6.4: Temperature sample frequencies (%) for average yearly temperatures
ranges
Not Protected Reserves
Sample Grid Random Grid Random
Less than 12 Deg. Celsius 10.56 10.49 12.04 12.08
12 to 18 Deg. Celsius 30.55 30.69 20.49 20.37
18 to 24 Deg. Celsius 27.95 27.71 28.76 28.79
More than 24 Deg. Celsius 30.94 31.1 38.7 38.75
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Table 6.5: Type of soil: frequencies (%) IGAC classification
Not Protected Reserves
Sample Grid Random Grid Random
Aa 2.45 2.4 0.96 0.95
Ab 0.01 0.01 0 0.01
Ac 0 0 0 0
Ae 0.26 0.27 0.03 0.02
Af 1.38 1.39 2.33 2.34
Ag 0.01 0.01 0 0
Ah 0.1 0.07 0.79 0.86
Aj 0 0 0 0
Ak 0.14 0.14 0 0
Ca 0.25 0.24 0.03 0.02
Cb 0.01 0 0 0
Cf 0.28 0.32 0.08 0.1
Cg 0.08 0.09 0 0.01
Ch 5.39 5.58 1.45 1.46
Cj 0.36 0.31 0.13 0.14
Ck 0.13 0.16 0 0
Cm 0.04 0.02 0.12 0.12
Cn 0.02 0.01 0.66 0.69
Dd 0.04 0.04 0 0
De 1.6 1.58 0.1 0.12
Df 0.51 0.47 0 0
Na 0 0.01 0 0
Nb 0.01 0.02 0 0
Nc 0.02 0.02 0 0
Nd 0.35 0.31 0.01 0.02
Ne 0.15 0.18 0 0
Nf 0.01 0.03 0 0
Ng 0.03 0.02 0 0
Pb 0.03 0.02 0 0
Pe 0.04 0.02 0 0
Pf 0.08 0.08 0.13 0.13
Pg 1.78 1.74 0.39 0.39
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Table 6.6: Type of soil: frequencies (%) IGAC classification - Cont.
Reserves Not Protected
Sample Grid Random Grid Random
Va 1.58 1.59 0.16 0.18
Vb 1.63 1.61 0.77 0.83
Vc 14.34 14.21 20.05 19.89
Vd 0.35 0.32 0.04 0.06
Ve 1.63 1.76 0.13 0.11
Vf 14.97 14.85 10.09 10.09
Vg 4.38 4.44 3.36 3.42
Vh 3.09 3.13 2.21 2.35
Vj 0.5 0.45 0.01 0.01
Vk 10.19 9.91 4.81 4.9
Vm 12.26 12.27 12.47 12.29
Vn 1.76 1.84 2.5 2.4
Vo 6.09 6.01 7.95 8.03
Vp 0 0 0.02 0.02
Vq 0.42 0.42 0.11 0.13
Vr 10.8 11.2 28.09 27.9
Vs 0.23 0.21 0 0
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Chapter 7: Results
In this chapter I present the results from applying the methodology described
in Chapter 6. I start by describing the results on the effect of access difficulty on
deforestation showing that forest fragmentation might occur (i.e. the deforestation
pattern may be non-monotonic spatially). Then I explore how this forest frag-
mentation is affected by governance capacity (i.e. the costs of enforcement). The
results are presented for two approaches, (1) using a cubic function of access diffi-
culty interacted with measures of enforcement capacity and (2) non-parametrically
using indicators for discrete ranges of access difficulty, again interacted with mea-
sures of enforcement capacity. The analysis compares results inside reserves and in
non-protected areas and the differences are discussed.
7.1 Spatial Non-monotonicity of Deforestation Probability
7.1.1 Exploratory Analysis
To start the analyses an exploratory assessment was performed to see if any
non-monotonic pattern over the access difficulty measure would be observable on
average indicating the potential presence of forest fragmentation. Figure 7.3 shows
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the deforestation averages for the both samples inside and outside the reserves, for
access difficulty divided in 20 access difficulty bins. Deforestation seems to start very
high close to the roads and falls steeply until a measure of 0.3 of access difficulty.
after that it levels out, disperses and in particular for the reserves climbs back up.
A non-linear pattern is therefore observable, particularly for the data corresponding
to the reserves, encouraging further analyses. Figures for several other numbers of
bins can be found in the Appendix D.
Additionally, to make sure the approach of splitting the datasets in reserves
and not reserves was pertinent, a Chow test was run to test if all coefficients be-
tween the two groups were equal, The test rejected the null hypothesis with an
F(799,194990)=2.06 for the grid sample and an F(797,224920)=2.16 for the random
sample. Additionally tests to check if the access difficulty and the fiscal performance
index variables and their interactions are equal between reserves and not protected
areas ,1 were different between reserves and not protected were also run resulting in
F(7,154383)=23.34 for the grid sample and F(7,178044)=19.21 for the random sam-
ple, rejecting again the null hypothesis for these coefficients being equal between the
groups. Therefore the results here presented are calculated separately for reserves
and not protected areas.
1The tests here reported were performed using the cubic interacted models. A similar results
was obtained for the tests without interactions between access difficulty and fiscal performance
index
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7.1.2 Cubic Function of Access Difficulty
The results for the regressions including the cubic form of access difficulty, but
without the enforcement variable are shown in column (1) the tables 7.1 and 7.2 for
the grid and random sample within reserves and in tables 7.3 and 7.4 for the not
protected areas. The non-linear access difficulty coefficients are significant at a 0.01
significance level. The linear coefficient is negative, the squared one is positive and
the cubic one is negative again. These coefficients correspond to a initially decreasing
deforestation probability, closer to roads, then it becomes increasing and then it
falls back again as land become more inaccessible. There is statistical evidence that
the pattern of deforestation as one moves away from the road is non-monotonic
indicating the presence of forest fragmentation. Figure 7.3 shows the predictive
margins for and their 95% confidence intervals for access difficulty within reserves
and in not protected areas, for both the grid and the random sample. Both lines
initially show a decreasing probability of deforestation as one moves away from the
roads until about 0.2 measure of access difficulty. Then it the curve levels out for
the observations within reserves and it increases steeply for non-protected areas,
reaching a maximum at about 0.6 on the access difficulty scale. This shows that
fragmentation is possible in both areas, but likelier in non-protected areas.
7.1.3 Non-parametric Analysis
To check if this potential fragmentation is driven by the cubic functional form
selected, a non-parametric approach was also performed, where the access difficulty
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measure was replaced by dummies for different numbers of bins. The coefficients
resulting from this analysis are graphed in figure 7.3 for 20 bins2 and shown on table
7.5, for reserves and not protected areas and in both samples. The coefficients on
all the indicators are significantly different from zero, and significantly different for
estimates within and outside reserves. The arising pattern is potentially non-linear,
particularly for the areas outside reserves. These same results, for different numbers
of bins, are included in Appendix D.
7.2 Effect of Enforcement Capacity
The FPI variable individually, see columns (3) and (4) in tables 7.1 and 7.2
for the grid and random sample within reserves and in tables 7.3 and 7.4 for the
not protected areas, shows that the higher this index, the lower the probability of
deforestation within reserves. However, the contrary seems to be true for areas
outside reserves. This indicates that the municipality may be targeting reserves for
deforestation reduction measures, and leaving the rest of its territory unprotected.
This effect might seem small, but it means that a 1% increase in the deforestation
index would reduce deforestation in 0.1%. The total average deforestation per period
within reserves is about 4%, so a 0.1% change in deforestation attributable to a 1%
increase in the index, is important.
2bins after 0.9 are grouped together since they have too little observations
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7.2.1 Cubic Function of Access Difficulty and Enforcement Capacity
The evidence supports the existence of forest fragmentation on the Colombian
Andes, since deforestation probability remains constant or grows as the measure for
access difficulty increases (i.e. land becomes more remote). The purpose of this
section is to further explore if this pattern is affected by municipal enforcement
capacity.
The first approach to investigate the relationship between access difficulty,
enforcement capacity and deforestation is to interact the continuous access difficulty
polynomial with the enforcement proxy. The results of this analysis are presented in
column (5) and (6) of the tables 7.1 and 7.2 for the grid and random sample within
reserves and in tables 7.3 and 7.4 for the not protected areas. Column (5) does
not include controls for other municipal characteristics or distances and column (6)
does. The coefficients for both, the individual access difficulty terms and interactions
remain significant within reserves, showing that the pattern arising within reserves is
significantly affected by the enforcement capacity. For not protected areas however
the results are not so clear, the coefficients change signs and become insignificant,
when interacted with the enforcement variable. The significance of the effect of the
enforcement variable in non-protected areas is therefore not clear.
To be able to visualize these results, the predicted deforestation probabilities
are graphed in Figure 7.3 along the difficulty of access measure, for the results
in column (6), for three different levels of the FPI (the mean, percentile 5 and
percentile 95). The right column corresponds to calculations within reserves and
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the left column for the calculations outside reserves. Although the non-monotonic
pattern for the not protected area looks stronger, the effect of the enforcement
variable is less discernible. Moreover, recall that the coefficients graphed for non-
protected areas are not consistently significant.
In opposition, for the results inside reserves, higher enforcement capacity
(p95=63.49/100 FPI), the green line flattens, signaling lower probabilities of de-
forestation appearing in middle areas. However, when the enforcement variable has
a low value (p5=48.74/100 FPI), the pattern becomes steeper, reaching a maximum
around 0.6 on the access difficulty axis. This means that increased enforcement
capacity is related to a decrease in the probability of finding forest fragmentation.
The magnitude of this effect is small but not insignificant, since a change from
low (5th percentile) and high (95th percentile) enforcement capacity changes on
average the deforestation probability from about 3% to about 5-6%, as illustrated
by the difference between the green and blue lines. Off coarse this effect is only
observed at the maximum difference location and with a substantive change in the
FPI (about 15 points).
7.2.2 Non-parametric Analysis and Enforcement Capacity
To investigate if the above results are driven only by the functional form cho-
sen, a non-parametric approach was also performed, where the access difficulty mea-
sure was replaced by a vector of dummies, corresponding to indicators of different
access difficulty bins. The coefficients accompanying these indicators and their in-
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teractions with enforcement capacity measure, are shown in table 7.6 and graphed in
figure 7.3. In reserves, the higher levels of enforcement capacity (green) take lower
values than the lower enforcement capacity measures (in blue). Although harder
to see, enforcement capacity does not decrease the probability of deforestation in
non-protected areas, rather the opposite.
These non-parametric results echo the polynomial form results, particularly in
the effect that the enforcement capacity proxy has on the pattern within reserves,
as compared to outside them. It shows, as with the polynomial, that the likelihood
of finding deforestation in less accessible areas can increase when and if enforcement
decreases.
7.2.3 Robustness
The polynomial results show that enforcement capacity reduces illegal (in re-
serves) deforestation, more so in places less accessible from the roads. This effect is
not observable or significant in non-protected areas. Non-parametric analysis agrees
with not finding a positive effect of enforcement in non-protected areas, and supports
the result for reserves at medium levels of access difficulty. As robustness checks,
all the results were performed on two different samples, the grid and the random
one showing consistency between the estimates. The results were also calculated for
regressions with and without additional time, varying municipality and other linear
distances controls, and the signs and the magnitudes of the effects are robust to all
these changes.
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The regressions with all the controls and all the interactions, column (6) in
tables 7.1, 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 were also run in logit form. And the average marginal
affects and their standard errors are shown in table D.5 in appendix D. The signs
are consistent with the LP models but significance varies.
7.3 Discussion
I find evidence for forest fragmentation inside and outside the reserves. This
result is backed up not only by the significant coefficients on the cubic polynomial
but also by the non-parametric analysis which confirms the increase in deforestation
probability as one moves away from roads. Since deforestation is in general not
allowed in Colombia, this could be evidence of a hiding behaviour from the farmer’s
point of view.
For the non-protected areas, this effect however, is not attributable directly
to lack of enforcement capacity at the municipal level. This seems reasonable since
deforestation outside reserves is not a municipal level responsibility, but a respon-
sibility of the CARs only. The municipalities, since they benefit directly from local
taxes on income, could even be aligned with deforestation outside reserves. The
non-monotonicity of deforestation outside reserves could be due also to illegal crops,
which have very low transportation costs for the farmers, even at remote places.
Normally these products are picked up at the farm gate and taken directly to pro-
cessing stations distant from the roads and administrative centers. In this sense the
transportation costs for illegal crops might be close to 0 for the farmer. Therefore,
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it is more likely that illegal crops appear in remote places.
Inside the reserves I find that forest fragmentation is affected by enforcement
capacity. This could mean that the forest reserves are being included, at least for
the municipalities that have better capacity to generate and manage funds, not only
in the territorial organization plans (POTs) but also in their monitoring and en-
forcement activities. In general, I find that, all along the access difficulty gradient,
enforcement capacity reduces deforestation probability within reserves. Importantly
however, this effect is larger at medium distance places, where deforestation prob-































































































Deforestation average calculated for 20 bins
                   Grid Sample                                              Random Sample
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Predictive Margins of reserve with 95% CIs













































Predictive Margins of DummySlope#reserve with 95% CIs
Figure 7.3: Effect of access difficulty on deforestation w/o enforcement
interactions (20 bins)
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Grid Sample Not Protected
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Predictive Margins with 95% CIs
Figure 7.4: Effect of access difficulty and fiscal performance index on
deforestation probability
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Predictive Margins of DummySlope with 95% CIs
Figure 7.5: Non parametric analysis results, coefficients for 20 bins
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Tables
Table 7.1: Effect of enforcement and access difficulty on deforestation in reserves -
grid sample
Dependent Variable: Deforestation in Reserves
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Access difficulty linear −0.466∗∗∗ −0.398∗∗∗ −0.471∗∗∗ −0.412∗∗∗ −1.254∗∗∗ −1.340∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.042) (0.038) (0.043) (0.341) (0.388)
Access difficulty squared 1.014∗∗∗ 0.884∗∗∗ 1.017∗∗∗ 0.906∗∗∗ 4.709∗∗∗ 4.740∗∗∗
(0.118) (0.129) (0.120) (0.132) (1.106) (1.236)
Access difficulty cubic −0.714∗∗∗ −0.606∗∗∗ −0.713∗∗∗ −0.620∗∗∗ −4.142∗∗∗ −4.027∗∗∗
(0.102) (0.110) (0.103) (0.112) (0.992) (1.089)
Fiscal Performance Index −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.001)
Acc. dif.linear Interaction 0.014∗∗ 0.016∗∗
(0.006) (0.007)
Acc. dif. squared Interaction −0.066∗∗∗ −0.068∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.022)
Acc. dif. cubic Interaction 0.061∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.019)
Number of Conflicts 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Rural Pop. Dens. 0.173∗∗∗ 0.143∗ 0.150∗∗
(0.062) (0.074) (0.074)
Land Owner GINI −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Dist. Municipio −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Dist. Principal Road −0.002∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Observations 69,548 57,961 64,869 53,431 64,869 53,431
F Statistic 15.846∗∗∗ 14.336∗∗∗ 16.100∗∗∗ 14.410∗∗∗ 16.031∗∗∗ 14.312∗∗∗
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
All the regressions control for: Soils, Precipitation, Temperature,
Slope, Elevation, Municipio and Year Effects
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Table 7.2: Effect of enforcement and access difficulty on deforestation in reserves -
random sample
Dependent Variable: Deforestation in Reserves
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Access difficulty linear −0.453∗∗∗ −0.350∗∗∗ −0.466∗∗∗ −0.372∗∗∗ −0.992∗∗∗ −1.184∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.039) (0.036) (0.041) (0.322) (0.365)
Access difficulty squared 0.996∗∗∗ 0.793∗∗∗ 1.019∗∗∗ 0.829∗∗∗ 3.563∗∗∗ 3.879∗∗∗
(0.113) (0.123) (0.116) (0.127) (1.062) (1.188)
Access difficulty cubic −0.694∗∗∗ −0.523∗∗∗ −0.706∗∗∗ −0.544∗∗∗ −2.838∗∗∗ −2.883∗∗∗
(0.100) (0.107) (0.102) (0.110) (0.970) (1.068)
Fiscal Performance Index −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗ −0.002∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.001)
Acc. dif.linear Interaction 0.009 0.014∗∗
(0.006) (0.006)
Acc. dif. squared Interaction −0.045∗∗ −0.054∗∗
(0.019) (0.021)
Acc. dif. cubic Interaction 0.038∗∗ 0.041∗∗
(0.017) (0.019)
Number of Conflicts 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Rural Pop. Dens. 0.162∗∗∗ 0.115 0.123∗
(0.062) (0.072) (0.072)
Land Owner GINI −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Dist. Municipio −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Dist. Principal Road −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Observations 79,815 66,570 74,529 61,446 74,529 61,446
F Statistic 17.345∗∗∗ 15.906∗∗∗ 18.226∗∗∗ 16.454∗∗∗ 18.128∗∗∗ 16.340∗∗∗
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
All the regressions control for: Soils, Precipitation, Temperature,
Slope, Elevation, Municipio and Year Effects
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Table 7.3: Effect of enforcement and access difficulty on deforestation in not pro-
tected area - grid sample
Dependent Variable: Deforestation in Not Protected Area
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Access difficulty linear −0.531∗∗∗ −0.561∗∗∗ −0.542∗∗∗ −0.577∗∗∗ 0.876∗∗∗ 0.380
(0.035) (0.040) (0.036) (0.041) (0.321) (0.377)
Access difficulty squared 1.501∗∗∗ 1.651∗∗∗ 1.533∗∗∗ 1.699∗∗∗ −2.610∗∗ −1.673
(0.126) (0.141) (0.130) (0.146) (1.312) (1.557)
Access difficulty cubic −1.119∗∗∗ −1.218∗∗∗ −1.160∗∗∗ −1.273∗∗∗ 2.133 1.875
(0.125) (0.137) (0.130) (0.143) (1.471) (1.754)
Fiscal Performance Index 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.001)
Acc. dif.linear Interaction −0.025∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006)
Acc. dif. squared Interaction 0.073∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗
(0.022) (0.026)
Acc. dif. cubic Interaction −0.058∗∗ −0.054∗
(0.024) (0.028)
Number of Conflicts 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Rural Pop. Dens. −0.106∗ −0.249∗∗∗ −0.248∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.067) (0.067)
Land Owner GINI −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Dist. Municipio −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Dist. Principal Road −0.001∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Observations 101,030 82,968 97,112 79,502 97,112 79,502
F Statistic 12.784∗∗∗ 12.498∗∗∗ 12.521∗∗∗ 12.241∗∗∗ 12.518∗∗∗ 12.205∗∗∗
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
All the regressions control for: Soils, Precipitation, Temperature,
Slope, Elevation, Municipio and Year Effects
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Table 7.4: Effect of enforcement and access difficulty on deforestation in not pro-
tected area - random sample
Dependent Variable: Deforestation in Not Protected Area
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Access difficulty linear −0.603∗∗∗ −0.614∗∗∗ −0.601∗∗∗ −0.617∗∗∗ 0.336 −0.156
(0.032) (0.036) (0.033) (0.037) (0.269) (0.310)
Access difficulty squared 1.803∗∗∗ 1.938∗∗∗ 1.783∗∗∗ 1.929∗∗∗ −0.029 1.209
(0.113) (0.125) (0.117) (0.129) (0.973) (1.101)
Access difficulty cubic −1.440∗∗∗ −1.545∗∗∗ −1.428∗∗∗ −1.543∗∗∗ −0.836 −1.628
(0.110) (0.118) (0.114) (0.123) (0.972) (1.051)
Fiscal Performance Index 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0005)
Acc. dif.linear Interaction −0.017∗∗∗ −0.008
(0.005) (0.005)
Acc. dif. squared Interaction 0.034∗∗ 0.014
(0.017) (0.019)
Acc. dif. cubic Interaction −0.012 −0.0000
(0.016) (0.018)
Number of Conflicts 0.005∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Rural Pop. Dens. −0.021 −0.194∗∗∗ −0.194∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.060) (0.060)
Land Owner GINI −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Dist. Municipio −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Dist. Principal Road −0.001∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Observations 116,693 95,798 112,161 91,773 112,161 91,773
F Statistic 14.319∗∗∗ 13.976∗∗∗ 14.029∗∗∗ 13.658∗∗∗ 14.016∗∗∗ 13.615∗∗∗
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
All the regressions control for: Soils, Precipitation, Temperature,
Slope, Elevation, Municipio and Year Effects
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Table 7.5: Non-parametric effect of access difficulty on deforestation (20 bins)
Dependent Variable: Deforestation
Reserves Random Not Protect Random Reserves Grid No Protect Grid
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Acc. Diff. bin 2 −0.028∗∗∗ −0.026∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 3 −0.027∗∗∗ −0.034∗∗∗ −0.027∗∗∗ −0.027∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 4 −0.039∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗ −0.035∗∗∗ −0.040∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 5 −0.041∗∗∗ −0.046∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗ −0.035∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 6 −0.043∗∗∗ −0.046∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗ −0.042∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 7 −0.043∗∗∗ −0.047∗∗∗ −0.047∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 8 −0.046∗∗∗ −0.045∗∗∗ −0.048∗∗∗ −0.035∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 9 −0.049∗∗∗ −0.036∗∗∗ −0.045∗∗∗ −0.043∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 10 −0.041∗∗∗ −0.041∗∗∗ −0.050∗∗∗ −0.037∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 11 −0.044∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗∗ −0.052∗∗∗ −0.033∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 12 −0.045∗∗∗ −0.040∗∗∗ −0.053∗∗∗ −0.033∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 13 −0.054∗∗∗ −0.032∗∗∗ −0.057∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 14 −0.049∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗ −0.053∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 15 −0.057∗∗∗ −0.025∗∗∗ −0.058∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 16 −0.055∗∗∗ −0.012 −0.068∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 17 −0.058∗∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗ −0.057∗∗∗ −0.009
Acc. Diff. bin 18 −0.044∗∗∗ −0.026∗∗∗ −0.056∗∗∗ −0.026∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 19 −0.037∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗ −0.063∗∗∗ −0.015∗
Acc. Diff. bin 20 −0.050∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗∗ −0.068∗∗∗ −0.015
Dist.Mun. −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
Observations 65,156 94,377 56,732 81,792
F Statistic 14.892∗∗∗ 13.511∗∗∗ 13.321∗∗∗ 12.093∗∗∗
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
All the regressions control for: Soils, Precipitation, Temperature,
Slope, Elevation, Municipio and Year Effects
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Table 7.6: Non-parametric effect of enforcement and access difficulty on deforesta-
tion
Dependent Variable: Deforestation
Res Random Not Prot. Random Res Grid Not Prot. Grid
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Acc. Diff. bin 2 −0.052 0.003 −0.084∗ 0.061∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 3 −0.041 0.037 −0.078∗ 0.061∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 4 −0.084∗∗ 0.045∗ −0.069 0.066∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 5 −0.116∗∗∗ 0.029 −0.116∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 6 −0.068∗ 0.037 −0.082∗ 0.057∗
Acc. Diff. bin 7 −0.106∗∗∗ 0.038 −0.127∗∗∗ 0.052
Acc. Diff. bin 8 −0.064 0.016 −0.058 0.088∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 9 −0.050 0.104∗∗∗ −0.094∗∗ 0.068∗
Acc. Diff. bin 10 −0.057 0.077∗∗ −0.082∗ 0.050
Acc. Diff. bin 11 0.005 0.050 −0.049 0.092∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 12 0.015 0.051 −0.055 0.042
Acc. Diff. bin 13 −0.024 0.076∗ −0.080 0.045
Acc. Diff. bin 14 0.0000 0.034 0.0001 0.030
Acc. Diff. bin 15 −0.062 −0.008 0.021 0.148∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 16 −0.011 0.067 0.071 0.014
Acc. Diff. bin 17 0.092 0.035 0.079 0.096∗
Acc. Diff. bin 18 0.033 0.057 0.083 0.102
Acc. Diff. bin 19 −0.158∗ 0.036 0.042 0.135∗
Acc. Diff. bin 20 0.023 0.111 −0.091 0.037
Fisc.Perf.Ind. −0.001∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 2:Fisc.Perf.Ind. 0.0004 −0.0005 0.001 −0.001∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 3:Fisc.Perf.Ind. 0.0000 −0.001∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.002∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 4:Fisc.Perf.Ind. 0.001 −0.002∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.002∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 5:Fisc.Perf.Ind. 0.001 −0.001∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.002∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 6:Fisc.Perf.Ind. 0.0002 −0.002∗∗∗ 0.0005 −0.002∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 7:Fisc.Perf.Ind. 0.001 −0.002∗∗∗ 0.001∗ −0.002∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 8:Fisc.Perf.Ind. 0.0000 −0.001∗ 0.0000 −0.002∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 9:Fisc.Perf.Ind. −0.0003 −0.003∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.002∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 10:Fisc.Perf.Ind. −0.0001 −0.002∗∗∗ 0.0004 −0.002∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 11:Fisc.Perf.Ind. −0.001 −0.002∗ −0.0003 −0.002∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 12:Fisc.Perf.Ind. −0.001∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.0002 −0.001∗
Acc. Diff. bin 13:Fisc.Perf.Ind. −0.001 −0.002∗∗∗ 0.0002 −0.001∗
Acc. Diff. bin 14:Fisc.Perf.Ind. −0.001 −0.001∗ −0.001 −0.001∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 15:Fisc.Perf.Ind. −0.0003 −0.001 −0.002 −0.003∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 16:Fisc.Perf.Ind. −0.001 −0.002∗∗ −0.003∗∗ −0.001
Acc. Diff. bin 17:Fisc.Perf.Ind. −0.003∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗ −0.003∗∗ −0.002∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 18:Fisc.Perf.Ind. −0.002 −0.002∗∗ −0.003∗ −0.003∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 19:Fisc.Perf.Ind. 0.002 −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗ −0.003∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 20:Fisc.Perf.Ind. −0.002 −0.003∗∗ 0.0001 −0.001
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
All the regressions control for: Soils, Precipitation, Temperature,
Slope, Elevation, Municipio and Year Effects
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Chapter 8: Discussion and Public Policy Implications
Theoretical results presented in Chapter 4 show how illegal farming, either in
an area reserved for forestry uses and, or because the crop is illegal (i.e. coca and
poppy plantations), may result in forest fragmentation (i.e deforested patches may
appear inside the forest). The empirical results from the Colombian Andes support
this idea. Chapter 7 shows that such fragmentation appears away from roads, both
in reserves and also in non-protected areas.
Within reserves, land fragmentation may be exacerbated because these areas
were designed in the 50’s and the neighboring areas have faced development and
population growth. Therefore, potential profitable activities are now present in these
regions. In contrast, fragmentation outside reserves might be due to illegal crops
and or illegal mining. These activities, by their mere nature, are highly profitable,
again resulting in higher likelihoods of fragmentation.
Updating the delimitation of reserves to reflect current ecosystem services
values as well as development priorities, might reduce the deforestation pressure and
unwanted fragmentation. Moreover, recognizing the dynamics of the territories and
updating these delimitations accordingly, should help prevent further fragmentation.
On the other hand, legalizing and regulating illicit crops, would likely also reduce
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forest fragmentation. However, the policies and enforcement needed against illegal
crops falls outside the topic of this research, since it is a matter of national security
and military action.
The model also shows that where agriculture is profitable, but illegal, forest
fragmentation might occur due to enforcement costs. The analysis in Chapters 4 and
5 shows that fragmentation is more likely at places with high or steeply incrementing
enforcement costs, or high with high with slowly or non-decreasing profits (i.e. high
with slowly or non-increasing transportation costs). These enforcement costs are
affected by many factors. Therefore, with the objective to reduce unwanted forest
fragmentation, one might recommend actions to reduce implementation agencies’
enforcement costs in several ways, some of the them are described in the following
paragraphs.
First, the over-use of protected areas as the flagship conservation policy, focus-
ing principally on keeping the local people out of these areas, renders enforcement
costs very high, as compared to less extreme land use management policies. Pro-
tected areas, in which no other economic activity is permitted are the costliest to
enforce, and for which the implementation agency will likely face higher threats
of non-compliance. Alternative softer policies could reduce the enforcement costs
and would likely produce comparative conservation benefits. Some of these policies
include: mixed used landscapes, with natural vegetation corridors and low impact
agriculture, non-timber forest product extraction, silvo-pastoril practices, and even
sustainable forestry. All of these policies have a lower impact on local income,
dissuading and reducing the likelihood of braking the law, even in less monitored
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areas.
Second, as opposed to the local communities, enforcement agencies person-
nel often do not know the terrain well, resulting in much higher monitoring and
enforcement costs. These costs might be reduced by engaging the local communi-
ties to help with the monitoring and enforcement activities. Hiring local people as
field supervisors would be a straight forward alternative. Additionally, educating
communities about pertaining conservation policies, as well as on the existing alter-
natives to denounce violations of such policies, might also reduce the enforcement
agencies’ costs.
Third, local enforcement agencies often rely on precarious monitoring tech-
nologies, which are very costly, and these costs increase with access difficulty. New
technologies could decrease the costs of monitoring in remote areas. For example,
remote sensing and drones. Remote sensing images together with geographic in-
formation systems (GIS) technology could be made available to the enforcement
agencies in charge of implementing deforestation prevention. This type of technol-
ogy can be used to identify illegal land use change almost in simultaneous time, and
it has the same cost independent of locations. Alternatively, the central government
could use such technologies to prioritize municipalities with high deforestation and
reach out to them and advise targeted personal surveillance. Another option useful
in particular where the road network ends, is drone technology. This technology
allows to take videos or pictures standing on the road network, without having to
reach unaccessible areas personally.
Fourth, enforcement costs are high when implementation agencies are dis-
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organized and work with untrained personnel. Recognizing the improvisation and
precariousness of some of these institutions, local capacity building of officials should
be a priority. Periodic training workshops and distributing material in environmen-
tal policies and regulation, as well as the local government responsibilities would be
ideal. More on this later in this chapter.
Fifth, enforcement costs where information is lacking may become prohibitively
high. The meager information systems in local institutions makes them prone to
regulatory capture1 and corruption. Promoting the construction of environmental
indicators, at the local level, as well as other transparency information, regarding
funds sources and destinations, could help keep enforcement costs low.
The empirical chapter shows that fragmentation is linked to the fiscal per-
formance index as a measure of enforcement capacity through budget management
capacity. The analysis shows that forest fragmentation within reserves is less likely
when the fiscal performance index is high. Governments of municipalities with high
fiscal performance index exhibit higher budgetary independence from the central
government’s transfers, better proficiency at managing their operating costs, as well
as better competence at collecting local taxes.
The empirical analysis suggests that improving FPI would result in less forest
fragmentation within reserves. To improve FPI one could help the municipality to
get better at managing the resources they already have, or augmenting the funds
they already receive, as well as finding new ways to gain access to resources.
1Regulatory capture means here undue influence of powerful grups on regulation or compliance
with it.
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Previous investigations [79, 82] have found that municipalities in Colombia
present deficient human capacity to handle their responsibilities. Not only do they
have too little workers, but workers often are not capable of doing their assignments,
either because they ignore their specific tasks or they do not have the knowledge
needed to perform such tasks correctly. Several types of capacity building activities
including workshops and summarized easy accessible reference material (i.e websites
designed to work well on cellphones) should be performed at least at the beginning of
each government period. The topics for these training activities should range from:
knowledge of the responsibilities of the municipality, to bookkeeping, environmental
law and regulation (including available tools for land management), and potential
new sources of income.
Municipalities have also been described as lacking information, [79] making
them prone to regulatory capture and corruption, particularly in land use matters.
Designing a simple yet effective municipality level indicator system, in particular
for environmental matters, and promoting its implementation should help improve
transparency. The information produced by such a system should be publicly avail-
able such that NGOs as well as the community could help keep the authorities
accountable and liable for their land use decisions and their implementation.
Promoting environmental education for the community, including the value of
local forests and ecosystems as well as recognizing the benefits of such forests, not
only for the global population in term of climate change, but for the more local
ecosystem services, such as water provision and regulation and landslide prevention,
should help raise awareness and provide support for local governments with such
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concerns as well as better accountability.
To improve the amount of resources that municipalities already have access
to, it is important to note that Colombia is not efficient at collecting taxes. One of
the reasons for a low fiscal return is because of outdated and faulty or non-existent
land property records. General efforts to improve this information could increase
the municipal property tax base, giving the municipalities (and the CARs) more
funds.
The central government has several funds which are available for projects pre-
sented by municipalities. Such funds more than often are not exhausted, because the
process to access them involves unsurmountable steps for municipal governments.
Even if there is capacity building to access such funds, municipalities would benefit
from a two stage process to access such funds, including a first step with a project
idea and the related support for the development of the project, before the full grant
is assigned to the fully developed project proposal.
Municipalities should also have access to new types of funding sources. Funds,
for example from the National Royalty Fund, could be prioritized for conservation
or land management projects presented in alliance between CARs and municipal-
ities. This would give the municipality additional funds and should improve the
relationships between CARs and municipalities and strengthen the municipalities’
environmental administration capacity.
Moreover, environmental projects jointly designed by the municipality and the
CARs, should be funded by the share of the property tax which is assigned to the
CARs. Therefore, the municipalities would not feel so resented towards the CARs
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and their lack of attention to municipalities’ issues and at the same time the CARs
would have some of their environmental duties truly shared by the municipalities’
governments.
Another potential source of funding for municipalities is the development of
payments for ecosystem services projects. The regulation in Colombia already gives
municipalities the authority to set up such payments for ecosystem services schemes,
in particular for water regulation and carbon sequestration purposes. Municipalities
together with the CARs could also propose zoning within forest reserves, including
areas for sustainable forestry, and therefore gain access to forest concession fees.
Given Colombia’s importance in terms of biodiversity and forest cover, in-
ternational funds could be levied to fund some of the capacity building activities,
environmental education, as well as information and technology applications de-
scribed above. Specifically, for such projects which are designed to be sustainable,
but only lack initial investment.
Lastly if additional levied funds are used to improve the capacity of adminis-
trative personnel a self-enforcing cycle could be created, because better management
should also be able to access more funds.
While the fiscal performance index affects fragmentation in reserves, it does
not in non-protected areas. This could be because the municipalities might not have
the resources to cover all the area under their authority, and chose to protect the
reserves, while allowing hidden deforestation for illegal crops outside them. The
recommendations above, to help increase the municipalities budget, in particular
for environmental matters, and improve their management capacity should also help
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them reduce fragmentation outside protected areas. Nevertheless it is important to
note, that for illicit crops legalization would also render a decrease in fragmentation,
while further recommendations on the control and management of illicit crops exceed
the limits of this dissertation.
8.1 Conclusion
This work shows how the expected effect of deforestation deterrence policies
can be spatially changed by surveillance and enforcement capacity. In particular, it
recognizes that surveillance and enforcement costs vary with space, such that for an
implementing agency, short in capacity or budget, there is incentive to enforce se-
lectively in more accessible places, while leaving the less accessible areas unwatched.
The theory shows that in places where the surveillance and enforcement costs in-
crease steeply as compared to the agricultural transport costs, this interaction can
result in a broken deforestation pattern, where deforestation appears again in re-
moter less monitored places. This fragmented deforestation pattern, as one moves
away from roads, is also found empirically, in the Colombian Andes. The empirical
work also shows, that within reserves fragmentation is reduced as institutional ca-
pacity improves. To reduce fragmentation, strengthening the municipalities capacity
to obtain more resources and manage their funds would be beneficial.
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Appendix A: Mathematical Derivations
A.1 Derivation of decision function for costly enforcement problem
The problem can be solved, as before, separately for each point in space. So
for a particular s the problem is as follows (dropping the dependence on s):
max
a,e
πa+ φ[l − a]− kel (A.1)
s.t.
π[l − a]
[r − τ ]l
≤ e (A.2)
Since e is linear in the objective function, the condition will be met with
equality, so we can replace e in the objective function and have a linear problem
with one variable a:
max
a
πa+ φ[l − a]− kπ[l − a]
[r − τ ]
(A.3)
Taking the derivative with respect to a we obtain:
π[1 +
k
[r − τ ]
]− φ (A.4)
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A.2 Decision Function Derivatives


















Q′(s) = π(s)K ′(s) + π′(s)(1 +K(s)) (A.7)
Taking the derivative of K with respect to s and dropping the dependence on
s for ease of notation, we have:
K ′ =
k′(r − τ) + kτ ′
(r − τ)2
> 0 (A.8)
Remembering that π(s) = (r − τ(s)− c)
Q′ = (r − τ − c)
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Second derivative of Q with respect to s
Q′(s) = π(s)K ′(s) + π′(s)(1 +K(s)) (A.14)
Taking the derivative w.r.t. S gives:
Q′′(s) = π(s)′K ′(s) + π(s)K ′′(s) + π′′(s)(1 +K(s)) + π′(s)K ′(s) (A.15)
Q′′(s) = π(s)K ′′(s) + 2π′(s)K ′(s) + π′′(s)(1 +K(s)) (A.16)
Now taking the second derivative of K w.r.t. s, we have:
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K ′′ =
(k′′ − 2τ ′2k)(r − τ)− kτ ′′
(r − τ)2
(A.17)
Replacing and recalling π′ = −τ ′:
Q′′ = (r − c− τ)













Appendix B: Numerical Calibration Details
B.1 Potato in Antioquia and Narino
This appendix summarizes the principal characteristics of potato cultivation
in Colombia, as background for the numerical simulation estimates presented in
the main text. Potato in Colombia is one of the principal transitory agricultural
products accounting for more than 30% of the Colombian transitory agricultural
production. Most of the national potato production is centered in 4 departments:
Cundinamarca, Boyaca, Narino, and Antioquia. Also, most of the potato produced
in Colombia is consumed fresh and within the country. From the potato production
in the country, only 8% goes to industry (to produce chips or frozen French fries),
10% is self-consumption, 64% is commercialized domestically, and the remaining is
used as seeds.
Although more than 30 varieties of potato are produced in Colombia, 90% of
the production consists of only three varieties: Diacol Capiro (R12), Parda pastusa,
and Parda Suprema. The next table shows by area cultivated, the principal varieties
and departments.
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Total Area Cultivated Principal Potato Varieties
Department with Potato (ha) 2009 Pastusa Suprema Parda Pastusa Diacol Capiro
Antioquia 13,070 0 0 10,450
Boyaca 36,820 12,887 7,364 7,732
Cundinamarca 52,825 27,369 11,552 9,509
Narino 20,505 4,511 2,871 6,972
Others 11,420 1,350 5,800 1,713
Total 134,640 46,117 27,587 36,376
Table B.1: Area of potato variety by department 2009. Source: National Potato Council (CNP, 2010)
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Most of potato agriculture in Colombia is done on higher altitudes, on slopes,
with low mechanization, and is rain-fed. Therefore production depends on rain
seasonality. There are only precarious storage facilities. Prices therefore generally
reflect the variability in production.
Potato producers are usually classified in small (less than 3 ha), medium (be-
tween 3 and 10 ha) and large producers (more than 10 ha). About 85% of the
production is done by smallholders. The intermediaries between the producers and
the consumers, who are in charge of gathering the production of many smallholders,
sorting it, washing it, packing it, and taking it to the market, have strong market
power. Some analysis argue that intermediaries charge unfair margins reporting the
producer’s margin as low as 51% to 59%.
For the calibration we picked two states which in addition to being significant
producers of potato, also exhibit deforestation in the period from 2005 to 2010 and
also have forest reserves: Antioquia and Narino.
We used the base year 2005 and all monetary units are presented in US dollars.
The exchange rate used is based on Bank of the Republic of Colombia data.1 The
inflation calculations were made by using the Consumer Price Index (CPI-U) which
is compiled by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
The next sections describe in detail the calibration estimates for agricultural
profits in Antioquia and Narino, starting with the direct and transportation costs.
1http://www.banrep.gov.co/es/series-estadisticas/see_tas_cam_otrasmonedas_dia.
htm (Accessed November 2015)
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B.1.1 Cost of Potato Farming
A detailed survey of potato producers that included, both, Antioquia and Nar-
ino producers, and specified small, medium and large producer costs was undertaken
in 2009 and the results are available online from Agronet Colombia, Costs Struc-
tures Survey.2 The costs were adjusted to exclude land rent (which was included as
a cost) and converted to 2005. A summary of the estimates are shown in the next
table. There are two potato production cycles per year, depending on rain seasons.
Table B.2: Potato production costs
Department Narino Antioquia
Size Small Medium Small Medium Large
Annual Cost (US$/ha) - 2005 $ 4,888 $ 8,512 $ 7,264 $ 6,130 $ 4,918
Yield per cycle (Ton/ha) 14 29 19 17 17
Yield per year (Ton/ha) 29 59 38 33 34
US$/ton - 2005 $ 171 $ 145 $ 189 $ 186 $ 146
Note that the yield per cycle here was estimated from the data reported in the
survey using the costs per ton and the total costs.3
The input transport costs, when reported, only amounted to 0.1 %, so they
are dropped from the calibration making. The input costs per ton then (c) would
range from: 145 to 189 US$/ Ton.
2http://www.agronet.gov.co/www/htm3b/public/boletines/Costos2009trim4/
Costos2009T4_archivos/frame.htm (Accessed December 2015)
3Yield data, however is available from better sources (not focused on costs) and this more
reliable yield data is used for the revenue calculation.
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B.1.2 Potato Transport Costs
A survey on agricultural transport costs between all principal cities was done
in 2006 and 2008 and cost estimates per ton are available from Agronet Colombia.
These estimates around the two capital cities of Antioquia (Medellin) and Narino
(Pasto) where coupled with distance information form Google Map to calculate
the relationship between costs and distance using a regression. The best fit to the
relationship obtained a linear function with a fixed cost (F ) that does not depend
on distance.
Table B.3: Output transport costs




Figure B.1: Transport costs estimated for 2005
B.1.3 Revenue of Potato Farming
The revenue has two components the yield and the price. Yield estimates are
available per department from Agronet Colombia for selected years, for the principal
products in each department. For Antioquia and Narino the available data for yield
between 2000 and 2010 have the following summary statistics.
The prices to the producer is not directly available, however, the market price is
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Table B.4: Potato yield per department
Yield (Ton/ha) Average Min Max
Antioquia 17 15 18
Narino 17 15 20
available on a weekly basis starting from 2013 at the National Statistics Department,
for each variety sold in each market. A weighted average for the 2013 prices of
the principal varieties sold in the markets in Antioquia and Narino was calculated
obtaining the following summary statistics, converted to 2005 dollars.
Table B.5: Potato prices
Potato price Average Min Max
US$/Ton - 2005 $ 215 $ 209 $ 220
However, this price, as was explained in the background section is sometimes
different than the price received by the producers, which is reduced by the transport
costs, and the distribution costs. The farmer’s share of the final market retail
price is around 50%, when the potatoes are sold in the capital city for example
[100–102]. However, the price we included in the calibration estimates corresponds to
markets within the same department and a high share of the commercializing margin
(and pertaining transport) occurs on transportation to capital cities. Therefore the
distribution cost margin used here is 10%.
B.2 Enforcement and Surveillance Costs
The next step was to estimate and calibrate the enforcement cost function.
Using the travel time and distance from Google Map between the capital city in each
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department and all the municipal capital within it, estimates for the enforcement
costs per hectare were calculated.
Four different types of costs were taken into account: Wage, Transport, Lodg-
ing, Food. They all depend on the distance to the center of the CAR (the adminis-
trative center, where the CAR offices are assumed to be located).
Transport - is calculated based on total kilometers driven. It is the dis-
tance, times 2, since the monitor has to come back as well. The transport costs per
kilometer were estimated in two ways: from bus tickets, and from gasoline prices
and average mileage per gallon. Information about bus ride costs is available from
ColombiaBusInfo.com. Information on gas prices is available at Sistema de Infor-
macion de petroleo y gas colombiano and was combined with fuel efficiency data
available at www.fueleconomy.gov to estimate plausible ranges for fuel costs.
The table below gives the max and min costs per kilometer obtained for each
method adjusted to 2005. The higher estimate of gasoline costs were used in this
analysis, since most of the enforcement (when done) occurs in private vehicles and
these vehicles more than often are all-wheel drive, because of the bad state of the
roads.
Wage - is calculated based on the total hours the trip takes. To keep all
the estimates depending on the kilometers, a regression coefficient was estimated to
turn the km into hours using Google map data. The minimum wage in Colombia,
available at Bank of the Republic4 was used as the minimum estimate and an average
“public sector” employee wage estimate presented by [111] was used as the upper
4http://banrep.gov.co/es/tags/salario-minimo-0 (Accessed October 2015)
121
estimate. The wage cost used in the estimation was the average “public” employee
estimate, since monitors need to have at least some technical background to be able
to do their job.
Food - is calculated based on the number of days monitors spend traveling. A
rounding formula is used and a day is assumed to have 8 working hours. When 8 or
less hours are needed to travel back and fourth, food for one day is budgeted. If the
time is between 8 and 16 hours two days of food are budgeted, and so forth. The
following table shows min and max estimates for the costs of food per day, however,
given the profiles of the monitors, the higher estimates were chosen.
Hotel - is calculated similar to the food, but based on nights spent (not days).
If the enforcement time takes less than 8 hours, no hotel costs are added in. If the
time traveling is between 8 and 16 hours, one night is added, and so forth. The
lower and upper estimate for the costs per night are shown below, but again the
higher one was chosen for the estimation of the enforcement cost curve.
Table B.6: Enforcement and surveillance costs
Costs (US$) - 2005 Min Max
Bus (per km) 0.063 0.084
Gasoline (per km) 0.007 0.245
Wage (per hour) 0.68 2.56
Food (per day) 12.93 21.54
Hotel (per night) 21.54 64.63
Regression estimates for different functional forms are added in the graph.
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The quadratic form was chosen because of simplicity and better fit. Non-linearity
was needed such that the Theoretical model assumptions are met.
Figure B.2: Enforcement costs estimated for 2005 Antioquia and Narino
Table B.7: Parameters for enforcement costs
Function k0 k1
k1x
2 + k0 0.0025 38.5
k1x





In this section we apply Descartes Rule to the quadratic form of enforcement
costs to find conditions under which the leapfrog pattern could exist. The conditions
are focused on the ecosystem service (ES), transport cost (t), and enforcement cost
(k1) parameters. The analysis is done first numerically and then algebraically.
B.3.1 Numerically
Decision function DF=ES:
ES(174− st) + k1s2(st− 29)− 20s2t2 + 4099st− 102051
st− 174
= 0 (D.1)
Reorganizing terms we get:
(174ES − 102051) + (4099− ES)ts− (20t2 + 29k1)s2 + k1ts3 = 0 (D.2)
1. The last term is always positive under the assumptions of the model
2. The third term is always negative under the assumptions of the model
3. The second term is positive if ES < 4099 US$/ha
4. The first term is negative if ES < 568 US$/ha
Putting these conditions together, a maximum of 3 positive roots are possible
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2 + 1)(c+ F + (M − 1)p+ st)
F + (M − 1)p+ st
−ES−y(c+F +(M−1)p+st) = 0 (D.3)
Reorganizing terms we get:
[(1− k0)(c+ F + p(M − 1))− y(c+ F + p(M − 1))(F + p(M − 1))− ES(F + p(M − 1))]
+[(1 + k0)− y(c+ F + p(M − 1))− y − ES]ts
+[k1(c+ F + p(M − 1))− ty]s2
+[k1t]s
3 = 0
Define: FF = F + p(M − 1), then FF ≤ 0 and c+ FF ≤ 0
[(1− k0)(c+ FF )− y(c+ FF )(FF )− ES(FF )]
+[(1 + k0)− y(c+ FF )− y − ES]ts




1. The last term is always positive under the assumptions of the model
2. The third term is always negative under the assumptions of the model
3. The second term is positive if ES < (1 + k0)− y(c+ F + p(M − 1))− y
4. The first term is negative if ES < (1−k0)(c+F+p(M−1))−y(c+F+p(M−1))(F+p(M−1))
F+p(M−1)


















































































x=km t=0.01 t=0.02 t=0.03 t=0.04 t=0.05
Figure B.3: Derivative of the Decision function
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k1=0.05 250 500 250 500
250 500
250 500 250 500
k1=0.04 250 500 250 500
250 500
250 500 250 500
k1=0.03 0 250 500 250 500
250 500
250 500 250 500
k1=0.02 250 500 250 500
250 500
250 500 250 500
k1=0.01 250 500 250 500
250 500
250 500 250 500
y=US$/ha
x=km t=0.01 t=0.02 t=0.03 t=0.04 t=0.05
Figure B.4: Second Derivative of the Decision function
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Appendix C: Descriptive Statistics Details
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C.1 Reserves
Table C.1: Summary statistics for the random sample in reserves year 2000
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
Deforestation (0 or 1) 41,992 0.05 0.21 0 0 0 1
Access difficulty to road (0,1) 41,992 0.19 0.16 0.00 0.07 0.28 0.93
Distance to road (km) 41,992 9.12 7.05 0.0004 3.21 14.00 32.92
Fiscal Performance Index (0,100) 36,763 52.82 4.64 41.62 49.91 55.78 68.22
Number of Conflicts (No.) 41,992 2.93 3.40 0 0 4 70
Rural Pop. Dens. (1000pers./km2) 32,798 0.67 0.14 0.35 0.58 0.79 0.97
Land Owner GINI (0,100) 41,992 13.10 12.16 1.36 6.06 15.38 139.26
Dist. Municipio (km) 41,992 23.40 12.17 0.35 13.92 30.91 78.71
Dist. Principal Road (km) 41,992 28.62 21.61 0.01 11.74 41.50 88.83
Slope (degrees) 41,992 17.08 10.11 0.00 9.11 23.92 73.46
Elevation (m) 41,992 1,406.01 991.24 0 561 2,177 3,990
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Table C.2: Summary statistics for the grid sample in reserves year 2000
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
Deforestation (0 or 1) 36,615 0.04 0.21 0 0 0 1
Access difficulty to road (0,1) 36,615 0.19 0.16 0.00 0.07 0.28 0.92
Distance to road (km) 36,615 9.11 7.02 0.0004 3.21 13.93 33.38
Fiscal Performance Index (0,100) 31,994 52.80 4.64 41.62 49.88 55.78 68.22
Number of Conflicts (No.) 36,615 2.92 3.44 0 0 4 70
Rural Pop. Dens. (1000pers./km2) 28,591 0.67 0.14 0.35 0.58 0.79 0.97
Land Owner GINI (0,100) 36,615 13.16 12.14 1.36 6.06 15.38 139.26
Dist. Municipio (km) 36,615 23.34 12.17 0.28 13.92 30.78 78.21
Dist. Principal Road (km) 36,615 28.61 21.56 0.0004 11.75 41.31 88.92
Slope (degrees) 36,615 17.11 10.10 0.00 9.17 23.98 75.06
Elevation (m) 36,615 1,407.05 992.60 12 557 2,182.5 3,882
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Table C.3: Summary statistics for the random sample in reserves year 2005
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
Deforestation (0 or 1) 37,823 0.04 0.20 0 0 0 1
Access difficulty to road (0,1) 37,823 0.19 0.15 0.00 0.07 0.28 0.93
Distance to road (km) 37,823 9.19 7.11 0.0004 3.19 14.16 32.92
Fiscal Performance Index (0,100) 37,766 57.96 6.19 37.59 55.03 62.75 74.31
Number of Conflicts (No.) 37,823 6.54 6.18 0 2 8 38
Rural Pop. Dens. (1000pers./km2) 33,772 0.67 0.14 0.00 0.55 0.79 0.98
Land Owner GINI (0,100) 37,823 12.97 12.30 1.56 5.78 14.49 102.57
Dist. Municipio (km) 37,823 23.42 12.22 0.35 13.86 31.06 78.71
Dist. Principal Road (km) 37,823 29.16 21.79 0.002 12.05 42.65 88.83
Slope (degrees) 37,823 16.97 10.02 0.00 9.05 23.76 73.46
Elevation (m) 37,823 1,377.21 980.71 0 553 2,117 3,990
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Table C.4: Summary statistics for the grid sample in reserves year 2005
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
Deforestation (0 or 1) 32,933 0.04 0.20 0 0 0 1
Access difficulty to road (0,1) 32,933 0.19 0.15 0.00 0.07 0.27 0.92
Distance to road (km) 32,933 9.17 7.09 0.0004 3.20 14.10 33.38
Fiscal Performance Index (0,100) 32,875 57.99 6.20 37.59 55.03 63.03 74.31
Number of Conflicts (No.) 32,933 6.60 6.27 0 2 8 38
Rural Pop. Dens. (1000pers./km2) 29,370 0.67 0.14 0.00 0.55 0.79 0.98
Land Owner GINI (0,100) 32,933 12.92 12.12 1.56 5.78 14.49 131.53
Dist. Municipio (km) 32,933 23.41 12.21 0.28 13.93 30.98 78.49
Dist. Principal Road (km) 32,933 29.20 21.75 0.002 12.08 42.56 88.92
Slope (degrees) 32,933 17.00 9.98 0.00 9.16 23.81 63.86
Elevation (m) 32,933 1,375.70 982.33 20 550 2,120 3,882
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C.2 Not Protected
Table C.5: Summary statistics for the random sample in not protected year 2000
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
Deforestation (0 or 1) 62,245 0.07 0.25 0 0 0 1
Access difficulty to road (0,1) 62,245 0.11 0.12 0.00 0.03 0.15 1.00
Distance to road (km) 62,245 4.38 4.54 0.0000 1.24 5.91 34.15
Fiscal Performance Index (0,100) 57,726 53.61 5.09 39.14 50.07 56.01 77.24
Number of Conflicts (No.) 62,245 3.55 6.85 0 0 4 70
Rural Pop. Dens. (1000pers./km2) 45,230 0.68 0.11 0.32 0.60 0.77 0.97
Land Owner GINI (0,100) 61,458 18.70 20.62 1.36 8.39 20.74 1,239.82
Dist. Municipio (km) 62,245 14.57 9.10 0.02 7.50 19.85 55.32
Dist. Principal Road (km) 62,245 17.93 14.95 0.0000 6.50 25.63 84.70
Slope (degrees) 62,245 17.69 10.80 0.00 8.99 25.40 77.94
Elevation (m) 62,245 1,514.19 964.50 0 616 2,340 3,878
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Table C.6: Summary statistics for the grid sample in not protected year 2000
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
Deforestation (0 or 1) 54,001 0.07 0.26 0 0 0 1
Access difficulty to road (0,1) 54,001 0.11 0.12 0.00 0.03 0.15 1.00
Distance to road (km) 54,001 4.37 4.52 0.0001 1.23 5.90 34.37
Fiscal Performance Index (0,100) 50,098 53.60 5.10 39.20 50.07 56.01 77.24
Number of Conflicts (No.) 54,001 3.51 6.69 0 0 4 70
Rural Pop. Dens. (1000pers./km2) 39,273 0.68 0.11 0.32 0.60 0.77 0.97
Land Owner GINI (0,100) 53,293 18.63 20.23 1.36 8.39 20.74 560.93
Dist. Municipio (km) 54,001 14.58 9.12 0.05 7.52 19.85 55.35
Dist. Principal Road (km) 54,001 17.85 14.89 0.001 6.50 25.41 84.46
Slope (degrees) 54,001 17.65 10.79 0.00 8.93 25.48 72.41
Elevation (m) 54,001 1,514.83 964.77 17 620 2,343 3,826
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Table C.7: Summary statistics for the random sample in not protected year 2005
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
Deforestation (0 or 1) 54,448 0.08 0.27 0 0 0 1
Access difficulty to road (0,1) 54,448 0.11 0.12 0.00 0.02 0.15 0.99
Distance to road (km) 54,448 4.31 4.45 0.0000 1.22 5.82 34.15
Fiscal Performance Index (0,100) 54,435 58.58 6.29 29.57 54.74 62.17 83.58
Number of Conflicts (No.) 54,448 5.55 8.21 0 0 8 38
Rural Pop. Dens. (1000pers./km2) 52,031 0.68 0.11 0.02 0.60 0.76 0.98
Land Owner GINI (0,100) 53,771 18.62 21.67 1.56 8.13 20.36 1,281.53
Dist. Municipio (km) 54,448 14.59 9.05 0.02 7.58 19.88 55.32
Dist. Principal Road (km) 54,448 18.00 15.06 0.0000 6.54 25.45 84.70
Slope (degrees) 54,448 17.62 10.82 0.00 8.82 25.40 77.94
Elevation (m) 54,448 1,485.47 967.47 0 579 2,316 3,878
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Table C.8: Summary statistics for the grid sample in not protected year 2005
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
Deforestation (0 or 1) 47,029 0.08 0.27 0 0 0 1
Access difficulty to road (0,1) 47,029 0.11 0.12 0.00 0.02 0.15 0.92
Distance to road (km) 47,029 4.32 4.45 0.0001 1.22 5.86 34.37
Fiscal Performance Index (0,100) 47,014 58.54 6.24 29.57 54.82 61.97 82.59
Number of Conflicts (No.) 47,029 5.52 8.23 0 0 8 38
Rural Pop. Dens. (1000pers./km2) 45,003 0.68 0.11 0.02 0.60 0.76 0.98
Land Owner GINI (0,100) 46,427 18.46 20.91 1.56 8.13 20.36 675.66
Dist. Municipio (km) 47,029 14.62 9.07 0.09 7.61 19.89 55.35
Dist. Principal Road (km) 47,029 17.98 15.03 0.001 6.58 25.34 84.46
Slope (degrees) 47,029 17.61 10.82 0.00 8.77 25.55 72.41
Elevation (m) 47,029 1,490.06 966.72 17 588 2,321 3,886
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Deforestation average calculated for 10 bins
                   Grid Sample                                              Random Sample
● ●Not Protected Reserves
















































































































































Deforestation average calculated for 40 bins
                   Grid Sample                                              Random Sample
● ●Not Protected Reserves
Figure D.2: Deforestation average for access difficulty 40 bins
Table D.1: Non-parametric Accessibility Regression Results 10 bins
Dependent Variable: Deforestation
Reserves Random Not Protect Random Reserves Grid No Protect Grid
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Acc. Diff. bin 2 −0.014∗∗∗ −0.027∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 3 −0.022∗∗∗ −0.029∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 4 −0.025∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗ −0.029∗∗∗ −0.026∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 5 −0.023∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗ −0.027∗∗∗ −0.026∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 6 −0.027∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗ −0.034∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 7 −0.031∗∗∗ −0.010∗ −0.034∗∗∗ −0.009∗
Acc. Diff. bin 8 −0.035∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.042∗∗∗ −0.004
Acc. Diff. bin 9 −0.022∗∗∗ −0.011∗∗ −0.036∗∗∗ −0.003
Acc. Diff. bin 10 −0.019∗∗∗ 0.006 −0.040∗∗∗ −0.002
Dist.Mun. −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
Observations 65,567 94,500 57,047 81,912
F Statistic 15.136∗∗∗ 13.565∗∗∗ 13.560∗∗∗ 12.195∗∗∗
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
All the regressions control for: Soils, Precipitation, Temperature,
Slope, Elevation, Municipio and Year Effects
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Table D.2: Non-parametric Accessibility Regression Results 40 bins
Dependent Variable: Deforestation
Reserves Random Not Protect Random Reserves Grid No Protect Grid
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Acc. Diff. bin 2 −0.040∗∗∗ −0.026∗∗∗ −0.054∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 3 −0.046∗∗∗ −0.039∗∗∗ −0.059∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 4 −0.053∗∗∗ −0.040∗∗∗ −0.061∗∗∗ −0.039∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 5 −0.056∗∗∗ −0.047∗∗∗ −0.057∗∗∗ −0.036∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 6 −0.042∗∗∗ −0.052∗∗∗ −0.058∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 7 −0.056∗∗∗ −0.058∗∗∗ −0.062∗∗∗ −0.052∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 8 −0.066∗∗∗ −0.057∗∗∗ −0.071∗∗∗ −0.057∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 9 −0.065∗∗∗ −0.066∗∗∗ −0.076∗∗∗ −0.046∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 10 −0.062∗∗∗ −0.055∗∗∗ −0.076∗∗∗ −0.052∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 11 −0.068∗∗∗ −0.058∗∗∗ −0.073∗∗∗ −0.057∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 12 −0.063∗∗∗ −0.064∗∗∗ −0.076∗∗∗ −0.049∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 13 −0.065∗∗∗ −0.060∗∗∗ −0.076∗∗∗ −0.067∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 14 −0.062∗∗∗ −0.063∗∗∗ −0.080∗∗∗ −0.053∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 15 −0.070∗∗∗ −0.060∗∗∗ −0.085∗∗∗ −0.052∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 16 −0.070∗∗∗ −0.064∗∗∗ −0.077∗∗∗ −0.048∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 17 −0.068∗∗∗ −0.058∗∗∗ −0.082∗∗∗ −0.057∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 18 −0.074∗∗∗ −0.042∗∗∗ −0.075∗∗∗ −0.062∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 19 −0.068∗∗∗ −0.060∗∗∗ −0.075∗∗∗ −0.052∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 20 −0.061∗∗∗ −0.060∗∗∗ −0.083∗∗∗ −0.052∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 21 −0.065∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗ −0.084∗∗∗ −0.051∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 22 −0.064∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗ −0.083∗∗∗ −0.053∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 23 −0.067∗∗∗ −0.051∗∗∗ −0.089∗∗∗ −0.049∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 24 −0.070∗∗∗ −0.059∗∗∗ −0.083∗∗∗ −0.042∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 25 −0.069∗∗∗ −0.051∗∗∗ −0.091∗∗∗ −0.047∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 26 −0.085∗∗∗ −0.051∗∗∗ −0.086∗∗∗ −0.045∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 27 −0.076∗∗∗ −0.033∗∗∗ −0.079∗∗∗ −0.040∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 28 −0.068∗∗∗ −0.050∗∗∗ −0.087∗∗∗ −0.041∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 29 −0.077∗∗∗ −0.040∗∗∗ −0.097∗∗∗ −0.034∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 30 −0.077∗∗∗ −0.043∗∗∗ −0.089∗∗∗ −0.032∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 31 −0.089∗∗∗ −0.037∗∗∗ −0.088∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 32 −0.069∗∗∗ −0.032∗∗∗ −0.100∗∗∗ −0.036∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 33 −0.085∗∗∗ −0.021 −0.099∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 34 −0.083∗∗∗ −0.042∗∗∗ −0.095∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 35 −0.077∗∗∗ −0.037∗∗∗ −0.089∗∗∗ −0.012
Acc. Diff. bin 36 −0.067∗∗∗ −0.046∗∗∗ −0.079∗∗∗ −0.040∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 37 −0.066∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗ −0.099∗∗∗ −0.043∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 38 −0.065∗∗∗ −0.045∗∗∗ −0.087∗∗∗ −0.036∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 39 −0.064∗∗∗ −0.045∗∗∗ −0.111∗∗∗ −0.024∗
Acc. Diff. bin 40 −0.069∗∗∗ −0.037∗∗∗ −0.100∗∗∗ −0.048∗∗∗
Dist.Mun. −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.0005∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
Observations 64,946 94,295 56,555 81,727
F Statistic 14.132∗∗∗ 13.254∗∗∗ 12.799∗∗∗ 11.863∗∗∗
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
All the regressions control for: Soils, Precipitation, Temperature,















































Predictive Margins of DummySlope#reserve with 95% CIs
















































Predictive Margins of DummySlope#reserve with 95% CIs
Figure D.4: Effect of access difficulty on deforestation w/o enforcement
interactions (40 bins)
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Grid Sample Not Protected



















































Random Sample Not Protected

























Predictive Margins of DummySlope with 95% CIs
Figure D.5: Non parametric analysis results, coefficients for 10 bins
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Predictive Margins of DummySlope with 95% CIs
Figure D.6: Non parametric analysis results, coefficients for 40 bins
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Table D.3: Non-parametric effect of enforcement and access difficulty on deforesta-
tion (10 bins)
Dependent Variable: Deforestation
Res Random Not Prot. Random Res Grid Not Prot. Grid
(1) (2) (3) (4)
dumdist.Road.Slope2 −0.023 0.055∗∗∗ −0.017 0.045∗∗
dumdist.Road.Slope3 −0.054∗∗ 0.033 −0.048∗ 0.038∗
dumdist.Road.Slope4 −0.033 0.046∗ −0.027 0.049∗
dumdist.Road.Slope5 0.003 0.099∗∗∗ −0.025 0.056∗∗
dumdist.Road.Slope6 0.039 0.071∗∗ 0.003 0.036
dumdist.Road.Slope7 0.031 0.046 0.046 0.024
dumdist.Road.Slope8 0.062 0.043 0.117∗∗ 0.062
dumdist.Road.Slope9 0.025 0.051∗ 0.147∗∗ 0.084∗
dumdist.Road.Slope10 0.047 0.085 −0.035 0.045
Fisc.Perf.Ind. −0.001∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
dumdist.Road.Slope2:Fisc.Perf.Ind. −0.0000 −0.001∗∗∗ −0.0000 −0.001∗∗∗
dumdist.Road.Slope3:Fisc.Perf.Ind. 0.0004 −0.001∗∗∗ 0.0003 −0.001∗∗∗
dumdist.Road.Slope4:Fisc.Perf.Ind. −0.0002 −0.001∗∗∗ −0.0002 −0.001∗∗∗
dumdist.Road.Slope5:Fisc.Perf.Ind. −0.001∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.0003 −0.002∗∗∗
dumdist.Road.Slope6:Fisc.Perf.Ind. −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.001∗
dumdist.Road.Slope7:Fisc.Perf.Ind. −0.001∗∗ −0.001∗∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.001
dumdist.Road.Slope8:Fisc.Perf.Ind. −0.002∗∗∗ −0.001∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗
dumdist.Road.Slope9:Fisc.Perf.Ind. −0.001 −0.001∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗
dumdist.Road.Slope10:Fisc.Perf.Ind. −0.002 −0.002 −0.0004 −0.001
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
All the regressions control for: Soils, Precipitation, Temperature,
Slope, Elevation, Municipio and Year Effects
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Table D.4: Non-parametric effect of enforcement and access difficulty on deforesta-
tion (30bins)
Dependent Variable: Deforestation
Res Random Not Prot. Random Res Grid Not Prot. Grid
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Acc. Diff. bin 2 −0.008 0.047 −0.084 0.071∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 3 −0.059 0.033 −0.128∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 4 −0.024 0.047 −0.143∗∗ 0.074∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 5 −0.055 0.083∗∗∗ −0.076 0.095∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 6 −0.105∗∗ 0.081∗∗ −0.121∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 7 −0.099∗∗ 0.044 −0.143∗∗∗ 0.067∗
Acc. Diff. bin 8 −0.100∗∗ 0.053 −0.150∗∗∗ 0.071∗
Acc. Diff. bin 9 −0.079 0.072∗∗ −0.121∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 10 −0.090∗ 0.047 −0.138∗∗ 0.084∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 11 −0.084 0.072∗ −0.126∗∗ 0.085∗
Acc. Diff. bin 12 −0.042 0.067∗ −0.110∗ 0.091∗
Acc. Diff. bin 13 −0.069 0.055 −0.116∗∗ 0.065
Acc. Diff. bin 14 −0.029 0.146∗∗∗ −0.118∗∗ 0.108∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 15 −0.080 0.107∗∗ −0.115∗∗ 0.093∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 16 −0.003 0.056 −0.102∗ 0.100∗
Acc. Diff. bin 17 0.024 0.105∗ −0.083 0.084
Acc. Diff. bin 18 0.005 0.055 −0.076 0.068
Acc. Diff. bin 19 0.003 0.084∗∗ −0.143∗∗ 0.093
Acc. Diff. bin 20 −0.001 0.129∗∗ −0.095 0.004
Acc. Diff. bin 21 0.010 0.035 −0.047 0.049
Acc. Diff. bin 22 −0.011 −0.0004 0.009 0.106∗
Acc. Diff. bin 23 −0.112∗ 0.070 −0.033 0.155∗
Acc. Diff. bin 24 −0.026 0.077 0.062 0.039
Acc. Diff. bin 25 0.018 0.042 −0.046 0.123∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 26 0.165∗ 0.076∗∗ 0.128 0.113
Acc. Diff. bin 27 0.004 0.093∗ 0.039 0.152∗
Acc. Diff. bin 28 −0.024 0.052 0.035 0.155∗
Acc. Diff. bin 29 −0.142 0.079∗∗ −0.032 0.107
Acc. Diff. bin 30 0.040 0.180∗∗ −0.156∗ 0.045
Fisc.Perf.Ind. −0.001 0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 2:Fisc.Perf.Ind. −0.001 −0.001∗∗ 0.001 −0.002∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 3:Fisc.Perf.Ind. 0.0002 −0.001∗∗ 0.001 −0.002∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 4:Fisc.Perf.Ind. −0.001 −0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗ −0.002∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 5:Fisc.Perf.Ind. 0.0000 −0.002∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.002∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 6:Fisc.Perf.Ind. 0.001 −0.002∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.002∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 7:Fisc.Perf.Ind. 0.001 −0.002∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.002∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 8:Fisc.Perf.Ind. 0.001 −0.002∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.002∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 9:Fisc.Perf.Ind. 0.0002 −0.002∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.003∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 10:Fisc.Perf.Ind. 0.0004 −0.002∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.002∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 11:Fisc.Perf.Ind. 0.0003 −0.002∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.002∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 12:Fisc.Perf.Ind. −0.001 −0.002∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.002∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 13:Fisc.Perf.Ind. −0.0002 −0.002∗∗ 0.001 −0.002∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 14:Fisc.Perf.Ind. −0.001 −0.004∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.003∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 15:Fisc.Perf.Ind. 0.0001 −0.003∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.003∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 16:Fisc.Perf.Ind. −0.001 −0.002∗ 0.0005 −0.003∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 17:Fisc.Perf.Ind. −0.002∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.0000 −0.002∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 18:Fisc.Perf.Ind. −0.001 −0.002∗∗ −0.0001 −0.002∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 19:Fisc.Perf.Ind. −0.002 −0.002∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.003∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 20:Fisc.Perf.Ind. −0.002 −0.003∗∗∗ 0.0003 −0.001
Acc. Diff. bin 21:Fisc.Perf.Ind. −0.002 −0.002 −0.001 −0.002∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 22:Fisc.Perf.Ind. −0.001 −0.001 −0.002 −0.003∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 23:Fisc.Perf.Ind. 0.0002 −0.002∗∗ −0.001 −0.003∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 24:Fisc.Perf.Ind. −0.001 −0.002∗∗ −0.003∗∗ −0.001
Acc. Diff. bin 25:Fisc.Perf.Ind. −0.002 −0.001∗ −0.001 −0.003∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 26:Fisc.Perf.Ind. −0.005∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗ −0.002∗
Acc. Diff. bin 27:Fisc.Perf.Ind. −0.002 −0.003∗∗∗ −0.002 −0.003∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 28:Fisc.Perf.Ind. −0.001 −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002 −0.004∗∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 29:Fisc.Perf.Ind. 0.001 −0.002∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.003∗∗
Acc. Diff. bin 30:Fisc.Perf.Ind. −0.002 −0.004∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.002
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
All the regressions control for: Soils, Precipitation, Temperature,
Slope, Elevation, Municipio and Year Effects
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Table D.5: Effect of enforcement and access difficulty on deforestation - logit average
marginal effects
Random Sample Grid Sample
Reserves Not Protected Reserves Not Protected
Access difficulty linear -0.574 0.547 -1.029∗∗ 1.513∗∗
(0.358) (0.432) (0.397) (0.461)
Access difficulty squared 1.766 -3.149 4.529∗∗ -8.717∗∗∗
(1.357) (2.464) (1.602) (2.578)
Access difficulty cubic e -1.157 3.913 -4.851∗∗ 11.25∗∗∗
(1.407) (3.300) (1.779) (3.391)
Fiscal Performance Index -0.00131∗ 0.00150∗∗∗ -0.00205∗∗∗ 0.00196∗∗∗
(0.000518) (0.000381) (0.000539) (0.000418)
Acc. dif.linear Interaction 0.00579 -0.0191∗ 0.0126 -0.0356∗∗∗
(0.00637) (0.00765) (0.00699) (0.00822)
Acc. dif. squared Interaction -0.0257 0.0805 -0.0702∗ 0.175∗∗∗
(0.0241) (0.0438) (0.0279) (0.0464)
Acc. dif. cubic Interaction 0.0188 -0.0895 0.0790∗∗ -0.214∗∗∗
(0.0250) (0.0588) (0.0306) (0.0619)
Number of Conflicts -0.00161∗∗∗ -0.000496∗∗ -0.00161∗∗∗ -0.000536∗∗
(0.000281) (0.000178) (0.000309) (0.000196)
Land Owner GINI 0.0832 -0.163∗ 0.140∗ -0.208∗∗
(0.0533) (0.0677) (0.0590) (0.0705)
Rural Population Density 0.00375∗∗∗ 0.00434∗∗∗ 0.00282∗∗ 0.00230∗∗∗
(0.000937) (0.000731) (0.000941) (0.000694)
Dist. Municipio -0.00114∗∗∗ -0.00116∗∗∗ -0.000795∗∗∗ -0.000848∗∗∗
(0.000145) (0.000169) (0.000149) (0.000183)
Dist. Principal Road -0.000622∗∗∗ -0.000594∗∗∗ -0.000464∗∗ -0.000571∗∗∗
(0.000151) (0.000137) (0.000156) (0.000144)
N 59508 89093 51480 77417
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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cias y patrones espaciales de deforestación en colombia. Instituto de Estudios
Ambientales-Ideam, 2011.
[90] Liliana M Davalos, Adriana C Bejarano, Mark Hall, Leonardo Correa, An-
gelique Corthals, and Oscar J Espejo. Forests and Drugs: Coca-Driven De-
forestation in Tropical Biodiversity Hotspots. Environmental science & tech-
nology, January 2011.
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Martha L Zárate Cadena-Vargas. Protocolo para la valoración económica de
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